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CHILD SAFETY RESTRAINTS: A CONTROVERSY
OVER SAFE INFANT AIR TRAVEL
BONITA C. BARKSDALE
I. INTRODUCTION
I frantically tried to hold my baby. She was screaming
bloody murder. I was sobbing. "Don't cry, Mom" my son
was saying as we crouched over in a crash position. Then
there was a terrible jolt, the sound of crunching metal-
the plane was flipping over. My baby was pulled out of my
arms. I thought the floor had given way or that she had
gone out of a hole or a window. I didn't even have time to
react, or tighten my grip. She was gone.'
W VITH THE TRAGIC deaths and injuries of several
young children in the Sioux City, Iowa, United Air-
lines Flight 232 crash and the Long Island, New York Avi-
anca Airlines Flight 52 crash,2 the issue of child safety
seats on aircraft began receiving increased attention.3
Studies of these and other airline crashes indicate that
I Michaelson, My Baby Really Didn't Have a Chance ... It Has To Be a Mirace,
REDBOOK, Nov. 1989, at 130. On July 19, 1989, United Flight 232 crashed in
Sioux City, Iowa. One hundred eleven people died including one infant. NTSB,
SAFETY RECOMMENDATION, May 30, 1990, at 1.
2 NTSB, supra note 1, at 5.
3 See, e.g., AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA,PETION-INFANT/CHILD
RESTRAINTS, February 22, 1990 [hereinafter ATA Petition](Air Transport Associa-
tion (ATA), an organization which includes the nation's commercial airlines, peti-
tioned the Federal Aviation Association (FAA) to require child safety restraints
aboard aircraft for children under the age of two); Airline Infant Safety Seats Re-
quired, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., Feb. 5, 1990, at 17; Younger, Straight Answers
About Safety Seats and Airlines, AAA WORLD, Nov.-Dec. 1990, at 10-12 (safety ex-
perts advocate child safety restraints aboard aircraft as a means for increasing
child safety).
202 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [57
three out of every five infants who have died during air
disasters might have lived had they been wearing mechan-
ical safety restraints. 4 Basically, "infant passengers expe-
rience excess mortality in survivable air crashes." 5
This comment discusses the tragedy that can occur
when children are not properly restrained on aircrafts.
The comment first examines the magnitude of the prob-
lem and its historical perspective. 6 Next, this paper ad-
dresses the legislation pertinent to mandatory child
restraint systems, namely, Senate Bill 1913, passed on Au-
gust 2, 1990, and House Resolution 4025, which was not
voted upon during the one hundred and first Congress,
but will be reintroduced during the next Congressional
session. 7 The comment then explores the arguments sup-
porting the passage of the House Resolution and the sub-
4 Address by Timothy P. Forte, NTSB spokesman, Journal of Air Law and Com-
merce 25th Annual SMU Air Law Symposium (February 22, 1991) [hereinafter
Forte] (transcript and videotape available from the offices of the Journal of Air
Law and Commerce, Southern Methodist University); Snyder, The Status of Infant!
Child Restraint Protection in Aircraft Crash Impacts, Flight Safety Foundation's Interna-
tional Aircraft Occupant Safety Conference and Workshop 79 (Oct. 31,
1988)(available from the FAA). See also infra note 35 and accompanying text.
5 Fife, Rosner, & McKibben, Relative Mortality of Unbelted Infant Passengers and
Belted Non-Infant Passengers in Air Accidents with Survivors, 71 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
1242, 1242-46 (1981)[hereinafter Fife].
6 See infra notes 11-72 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 73-91 and accompanying text. S. 1913, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.,
136 CONG. REC. S12014-15 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1990)(sponsored by Sen. Christo-
pher Bond, R. Missouri). See infra note 77 and accompanying text. H.R. 4025,
101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. H389 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1990)(sponsored
by Rep. Jim Lightfoot, R. Iowa). See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
The Senate bill enjoys an interesting history, having originated as an amend-
ment to the Air Travel Rights For Blind Individuals Act, S. 341, 10 1st Cong., 1st
Sess., 136 CONG. REC. S7450-57 (daily ed. June 6, 1990). The child restraint
amendment was later severed and promulgated as separate legislation. Child Re-
straint Amendment Wins OK, AIR SAFETY WEEK, June 11, 1990, at 3. The House
Resolution has not yet been considered by the full House. However, the Subcom-
mittee on Aviation of the House Committee on Public Works and Transportation
held a hearing on July 12, 1990 to consider the bill. Child Restraint Systems on Air-
craft: Hearings on H.R. 4025 Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on
Public Works and Transportation, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 1-433 (1990)[hereinafter
Child Restraint Hearings]; see also 136 CONG. REC. D863 (daily ed. July 12, 1990).
The House Resolution is expected to be reintroduced into Congress during the
102d Congress. NTSB Probe Raises Anew the Question of Child Safety Restraints, AIR
SAFETY WEEK, Nov. 19, 1990, at 3.
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sequent law requiring child safety restraints on aircraft.8
Finally, while the paper considers opposing viewpoints, 9 it
ultimately recommends mandating child safety restraints
on all aircraft.' 0
II. PRESENTATION OF THE PROBLEM
A. The Status Quo
Each day approximately sixteen thousand commercial
airline flights arrive and depart from United States air-
ports." An average of five to ten thousand infants and
toddlers travel daily on these flights.' 2 Four million chil-
dren under the age of two fly on United States domestic
flights each year.' 3  During these flights, every item on
board is securely fastened, preventing anything from
moving about the aircraft and causing passenger injury or
endangering equipment-every item, that is, except those
travelers who are under the age of two.' 4 As James Kol-
stad, Chairman of the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) comments, "all objects must be secured
during take off and landing, including coffee pots and lug-
gage. And yet . . . our precious children are not."' 15
See infra notes 92-236 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 237-337 and accompanying text. The approved Senate Bill and
the proposed House Resolution are identical except for an amendment to the
Senate Bill added at the time of its passage. See S. 1913, supra note 7; H.R. 4025,
supra note 7. This amendment indicates that United States carriers on interna-
tional flights should not have to require child restraints unless there is a standard
requirement established by the International Civil Aviation Organization. S.
1913, supra note 7, § 2; see also Four Aviation Bills Recommended for Senate Approval,
AVIATION DAILY, Aug. 1, 1990, at 205. Since the House Resolution remains un-
passed, this comment will emphasize the arguments concerning its passage. Pre-
sumably, these arguments also apply to Senate Bill 1913.
10 See infra Conclusion.
I McKenzie & Lee, Ending the Free Airplane Rides of Infants: A Myopic Method of
Saving Lives, CATO INST., Aug. 30, 1990, at 2.
12 Id.; see also ATA petition, supra note 3, at 5.
Is Younger, supra note 3, at 11.
14 Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7, at 83 (statement of Walter S. Coleman,
Vice President, Operations Air Transport Association of America (OATA)).
15 Waters, How do Planes Difer from Buses?, " NEWSWEEK, June 4, 1990, at 70.
Nora Marshall made a similar statement, "the FAA doesn't allow anything in the
cabin to be unrestrained except kids under two." Safety Recommendation Urges FAA
2031991]
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Under present law, children under two do not have to use
any type of safety device while travelling. Instead, they
may be held on a parent's lap.' 6
A considerable body of evidence indicates that child
safety restraints should be mandatory aboard all aircraft.
Both medical professionals and safety experts contend
that infants and young children travelling without proper
restraint face definite hazards.' 7 Tests have shown that
holding a child in one's arms offers the child virtually no
protection during a crash or severe turbulence.' 8 These
to Mandate Use of Infant Restraints; Seek Safer Seats for Older Children, AIR SAFETY
WEEK, May 29, 1990, at 1 [hereinafter Safety Recommendation Urges]. Walter S.
Coleman observes that the crash at Sioux City was unique because the crew had
time to anticipate and prepare for it. The cabin crew, in compliance with FAA
regulations, stored or restrained every loose item on the plane. That is, every
loose item except for three infants and one small child-ages eleven months to
twenty six months. One of these infants was killed; the other children suffered
injury. Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7, at 83-84 (statement of Walter S. Cole-
man, Vice President, OATA).
,6 16 14 C.F.R. § 121.311(a)(1-2), (b) (1990). This rule indicates:
(a) No person may operate an airplane unless there are available
during the takeoff, en route flight, and landing,
(1) an approved seat or berth for each person on the airplane who
has reached his second birthday; and
(2) an approved safety belt for separate use by each person on
board the airplane who has reached his second birthday, except that two
persons occupying a berth may share one approved safety belt and
two persons occupying a multiple lounge or divan seat may share
one approved safety belt during en route flight only.
(b) During the takeoff and landing of an airplane, each person on
board shall occupy an approved seat or berth with a separate safety
belt properly secured about him. However, a person who has not reached
his second birthday may be held by an adult who is occupying a seat or berth. A
safety belt provided for the occupant of a seat may not be used dur-
ing takeoff and landing by more than one person who has reached
his second birthday.
Id. (emphasis added).
See also 14 C.F.R. § 91.14 (3). This regulation provides in pertinent part "[A]
person who has not reached his second birthday may be held by an adult who is
occupying a seat or berth ...." Id. See generally Younger, supra note 3, at 11
(article examines current aviation laws concerning child safety restraints).
" Henretig, M.D., Children's Safety in Aircraft, SAFE RIDE NEWS, Fall 1989, at 2;
Fife, supra note 5, at 1245; NTSB, supra note 1, at 4-7; Child Restraint Hearings, supra
note 7, at 19 (statement of Rep. Jim Lightfoot).
is FAA-CIvIL AEROMEDICAL INSTITUTE (CAMI), Preliminary Report, SUMMARY OF
INFANT RESTRAINT DEVICES IMPACT TEST SERIES, (June 1989) [hereinafter FAA-
CAMI Report]; Fife, supra note 5, at 1245. The results of an FAA sponsored
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tests conclude that infant occupation of aircraft presently
constitutes an extreme safety risk.'" Not only are young
children at risk, unrestrained children also jeopardize the
safety of others on board the aircraft.2 ° Ironically, despite
opposing mandatory child restraint systems on aircraft,2 '
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) calls child re-
straint systems the best safety option for travelling chil-
dren.2 2 In fact, the FAA has published a brochure
advocating that parents "buckle up" their infants during
air travel. 3
The NTSB, the organization charged with investigating
and determining the cause of aviation accidents, 24 has ad-
dressed this problem. The Board recommends that the
FAA pass rulings to ensure the safety of all of its passen-
study, which examined all U.S. airline accidents since 1978, determined that safety
seats would have saved children from death and severe injury. Younger, supra
note 3, at 11; see also Snyder, supra note 4, at 89-90. Snyder reports on a University
of Michigan study which measured the ability of adults to protect lap-held chil-
dren during automobile crashes. The researchers concluded that children under
two years of age who travel on airplanes are also exposed to undue risks of injury
by the requirement that they be transported on adults laps. Id. at 90.
Bob Gibbons of Northwest Airlines indicates that severe turbulence constitutes
a hazard more real to the average traveler than a crash. Birnbaum, New Qualms
about the DC-JO: The Case for Safer Seats, TIME, Aug. 7, 1989, at 20. See infra notes
59-61 and accompanying text. On May 28, 1985, an Eastern Airlines Airbus 300
flew through a thunderstorm, encountering severe turbulence. An eight month
old baby flew out of his mother's arms, landing on the floor ten feet away. Sny-
der, supra note 4, at 80. A similar incident occurred on January 4, 1972 when a
747 encountered turbulence and a lap held six month old infant was thrown into
an overhead compartment and suffered facial and cranial injuries. NTSB, supra
note 1, at 2.
19 ATA petition, supra note 3, at 5.
- NTSB, supra note 1, at 6.
21 See infra notes 237-337 and accompanying text.
22 NTSB, supra note 1, at 4. "I would like to reemphasize that parents who
travel on aircraft with small children should use an approved safety seat for their
children." Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7, at 62, 64 (statement of AnthonyJ.
Broderick, Associate Administrator for Regulation and Certification, FAA).
23 FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION-U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
CHILD/INFANT SAFETY SEATS RECOMMENDED FOR USE IN AIRCRAFt (available from
the FAA) [hereinafter FAA brochure].
24 National Transportation Safety Board Reauthorization: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Aviation of the House Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. v (1990).
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gers, young and old.25 In the alternative, the Safety Board
suggests a legislative solution designed to better protect
children under the age of two who travel by air. 6
B. A Historical Perspective
Permissive language excluding infants under the age of
two from mandatory safety regulations which require seat
belt use aboard aircraft first appeared in the 1953 Civil
Air Regulations. 7 At the time of the passage of the 1953
regulations, child safety restraints were not available.
Studies showed that an infant who could not hold his
head upright or whose body had not matured enough to
fit the contours of a seat with a seatbelt could not properly
use an adult seat and safety restraint.28 Therefore, these
young children were initially excluded from safety re-
straint requirements.2 9 Further, because commercial air
travel was a fairly new phenomenon in the 1950's, chil-
dren rarely traveled on aircraft and were not a focus of
either safety regulations or legislation. 30  However, as
technology and research techniques have become more
sophisticated, not only has child protection during flight
become feasible, it has become a necessity. 3'
Since the 1960's, the FAA and other experts have con-
ducted research aimed at improving child safety aboard
2- NTSB, supra note 1, at 3, 7; see also Weinhouse, Keeping Kids Safer on Planes,
REDBOOK, Nov. 1989, at 132.
26 NTSB, supra note 1, at 1. Senator Christopher Bond contends that legisla-
tion must be promulgated, noting that without rulemaking authority, the NTSB
recommendation is merely a recommendation. Child Restraint Hearings, supra note
7, at 6, 7 (1990)(statement of Sen. Christopher Bond); see also id. at 83 (statement
of Walter S. Coleman, Vice President, OATA).
27 Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7, at 84 (statement of Walter S. Coleman,
Vice President, OATA).
2s Fife, supra note 5, at 1245; Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7, at v.
- Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7, at 84 (statement of Walter S. Coleman,
Vice.President, OATA).
50 Snyder, supra note 4, at 85.
3, Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7, at 84 (statement of Walter S. Coleman,
Vice President, OATA); telephone interview with Christy Cohen, Assistant to
Rep. Jim Lightfoot (October 15, 1990)[hereinafter Cohen].
aircraft. 2 Despite the fact that this research, including
some done by the FAA, indicates that child safety seats
offer improved protection for children travelling on air-
planes, no requirements mandating child restraints have
been passed.33 Under present law, children still travel un-
restrained, held only by a human force-their parent's
arms.
3 4
C. The Current Problem
The tragedy of allowing children to travel by air without
proper safety devices manifests itself dramatically. Dur-
ing the past two decades there have been numerous air-
plane accidents in which unrestrained children have been
severely injured or have died. In fact, the FAA has identi-
fied eight incidents involving commercial airlines that
have occurred during the past fifteen years in which the
proper use of child safety mechanisms might have re-
duced infant casualties.3 5 Two 1989 accidents, the crash
of United Airlines Flight 232 and the crash of Avianca Air-
lines Flight 52, demonstrate the danger infants and chil-
dren face when travelling by air without proper safety
devices.36
On July 19, 1989, United Flight 232 crashed during an
attempted landing in Sioux City, Iowa. 7 In preparation
for the crash landing, the flight crew followed standard
FAA crash procedures.3 8 Accordingly, flight attendants
instructed parents travelling with children under the age
of two to place their children on the floor, cushioning
them with pillows and bracing them between an adult's
32 Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7, at v; NTSB, supra note 1, at 6.
33 Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7, at 20 (statement of Rep. Jim Lightfoot);
NTSB, supra note 1, at 6; see 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.14, 121.311, supra note 16.
34 Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7, at 37 (statement of Susan M. Cough-
lin, Vice Chairman, NTSB).
35 Miscellaneous Operational Amendments, 55 Fed. Reg. 7415 (1990)[hereinaf-
ter 55 Fed. Reg. discussion].
36 Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7, at 19 (statement of Rep. Jim Lightfoot)
id. at 37-38 (statement of Susan M. Coughlin, Vice Chairman, NTSB).
"' NTSB, supra note 1, at 1.
38 Id. at 2.
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feet. 39 Three infants and one toddler were travelling on
board the craft.4 ° One mother aboard the flight recalled
that on impact her son flew off of the floor and into the
air, striking his head on the cabin wall several times
before she could grab him.4' This boy suffered severe
head injuries.4 2 Another child died when he slipped from
between his mother's feet and was thrown down the
aisle.43 In fact, every infant and toddler on board the
plane suffered injury in the crash.4 4 By contrast, some
adults aboard the aircraft, all of whom were restrained,
escaped uninjured.4 5
On January 25, 1990, Avianca Airlines Flight 52
crashed in Cove Neck, New York.46 Among the passen-
gers were seven children under the age of tWO. 4 7 Again,
in compliance with FAA regulations, parents were in-
structed to place small children on the floor. Tragically,
six of these infants received serious, life-threatening, and
in some cases, permanent injuries; the seventh was
killed. 48 These airline crashes are only two examples of
the great difficulty present in protecting unrestrained chil-
dren during a crash situation. Obviously, the standard
FAA safety procedures offered little protection to these
infants.
Other tragic crashes have occurred in which unpro-
tected children have perished or been seriously injured.49
In one crash, NTSB investigators were able to identify the
particular manner in which one of two infant deaths oc-
curred. On November 15, 1987, a Continental Airlines
so Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7, at 79 (statement of Jan Brown, flight
attendant, United Air Lines Flight 232).
40 NTSB, supra note 1, at 1-2.
4, Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7, at 388 (statement of Lori Michaelson).
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 NTSB, supra note 1, at 2.
45 Id. at 1.
46 Id. at 5.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 5; Forte, supra note 4.
49 Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7, at 49, 267-70.
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DC-9 crashed on takeoff from Stapleton International Air-
port in Denver, Colorado.5 0 Five unrestrained children
were on board.5 ' Two of these children died, and two suf-
fered severe injuries. 2 NTSB investigators determined
that one infant was thrown into the plane's bulkhead, re-
ceiving fatal blunt impact injuries, skull fractures, and tho-
rax injuries.5
Many researchers cite one particular air crash as the
most tragic example of the need for child safety restraints
on board aircraft. On April 4, 1975, Operation Babylift left
Saigon, Vietnam, carrying two hundred forty-seven or-
phans to new'homes in the United States.5 4 While en-
route the plane crashed; ninety-eight infants and children
were killed.5 5 Unfortunately, little is known about the cir-
cumstances on board this aircraft because of the Vietnam
War. 6 However, since safety restraints are neither
mandatory nor commonly used, it is assumed that none of
the children below the age of two were restrained by ap-
propriate safety mechanisms. 7 In another tragic crash, in
1978, three unrestrained children under the age of two
suffered fatal injuries when a United Airlines flight
crashed in Portland, Oregon.5
Fatalities and injuries to unrestrained infants aboard
aircraft do not occur solely during crash situations. Bob
Gibbons of Northwest Airlines indicates that severe tur-
bulence constitutes a hazard more real to the typical air
traveler than a crash. 9 In fact, during turbulence on a
-o NTSB, supra note 1, at 4.







- NTSB, supra note 1, at 3; NTSB, SAFETY INFORMATION (July 12, 1990) reprinted
in Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7, at 299, 304 [hereinafter NTSB SAFETY IN-
FORMATION]. This tragedy marked the first time the NTSB stressed to the FAA the
need for child restraint systems on aircraft. Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7, at
44 (statement of Susan M. Coughlin, Vice Chairman, NTSB).
s Birnbaum, supra note 18, at 20; see also Child Restraint Hearings, Public Works
1991] 209
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National Airlines 1972 flight, a lap-held, unrestrained in-
fant flew out of his holder's arms, struck his head on an
overhead compartment and suffered fatal head injuries.60
A similar incident occurred more recently on July 13,
1986, when an Eastern Airlines flight encountered expected
turbulence during landing. During this turbulence, a
seven month old, unrestrained infant flew upward, fell on
the armrest of the seat in front of his mother's seat and
suffered facial injuries.6'
Numerous other cases involving unrestrained infant fa-
talities on aircraft exist.62 In some instances, the circum-
stances have made it difficult to speculate about the
causes of death and the possibility that the children might
have survived had they been restrained.63 However, the
accidents discussed clearly demonstrate that restrained
adults frequently survive crashes in which unrestrained in-
fants die.64
Perhaps the best analysis of increased risks associated
with unrestrained infant air travel is a 1981 Harvard Medi-
cal School epidemiology study of 1976-1979 U.S. aircraft
accidents in which there were both survivors and fatali-
ties.65 This study determined that infant restraints could
and Transportation, (statement of Susan Bianchi-Sand, President, Association of
Flight Attendants) (Ms. Bianchi-Sand reviews numerous incidents of turbulence
injury to unrestrained children).
0 NTSB, supra note 1, at 3.
Id. at 4. In another case, an unrestrained seven week old infant sustained
serious head injuries when the American Airlines plane on which it was travelling
encountered expected turbulence. No adults were injured on this flight. Id. at 5.
62 Fife, supra note 5, at 1243-44; NTSB, supra note 1, at 1-7; see supra note 49
and accompanying text.
,' Snyder, supra note 4, at 80.
See generally NTSB, supra note 1. In many cases, the NTSB has established
that child safety restraints would have saved a child's life. Forte, supra note 4. The
NTSB knows of no aircraft fatalities involving a child wearing a safety restraint.
NTSB SAFETY INFORMATION, supra note 58, at 301.
65 Fife, supra note 5, at 1243-44.
US air carriers were involved in 21 fatal accidents during the period
1976-1979. Passengers died in 14 of these accidents. The remain-
der involved the deaths of aircraft crew or of people outside the air-
plane. Three of the 14 accidents with passenger deaths had no
survivors, and these three accidents accounted for 389 deaths. The
remaining 11 accidents had deaths and survivors among the passen-
[57
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have prevented three of the five infant passenger deaths
that occurred in the crashes studied, and concluded that
unrestrained infants undergo excessive mortality rates in
crashes in which adults survive.6 6
That more effective child restraint mechanisms are nec-
essary aboard aircraft is suggested by the deaths and inju-
ries which occurred in the accidents discussed, the test
results noted, and the testimony showing the impossibility
of holding onto an infant during either a crash or severe
turbulence. Medical literature, the FAA, and the NTSB
all indicate that air travel for unrestrained, young children
gers and accounted for 493 deaths. Four of these eleven aircraft had
children on board.
Id. at 1243. Crashes were excluded from the survey if there were no survivors or
no infants aboard or if deceleration was not a factor. Five international crashes
were also studied. The following table shows the crashes included in the study.
Id.
Place Year Passengers Died Survived
Portland, OR 1976 infants 3 0
noninfants 3 4
Portland, OR 1976 infants 0 3
noninfants 2 165
Ketchikan, AL 1976 infants 0 2
noninfants 1 40
St. Thomas, VI 1976 infants 2 1
noninfants 24 45
Finland 1963 infants 2 0
noninfants 17 2
New Zealand 1954 infants 2 1
noninfants 1 22
The following crashes were excluded from the analysis
St. Thomas, VI 1976 infants 0 0
noninfants 9 0
Canada 1978 infants 1 0
noninfants 34 0
Canada 1978 infants 0 0
noninfants 3 6
Los Angeles 1978 infants 0 2
noninfants 2 182
Denmark 1971 infants 1 0
noninfants 22 2
Greece 1972 infants 1 0
noninfants 36 16
Id. at 1243-1244.
- Id. at 1245.
67 See supra notes 18-20, 35-66 and accompanying text.
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is dangerous. Specifically, there is a "definite hazard in-
herent in air travel by infants and young children without
proper restraint.16 8 Indeed, "[a] small child sitting unre-
strained on a plane becomes a little missile when the air-
craft hits severe turbulence [or crashes]." 69 According to
the NTSB, this "missile" is not only at an increased risk of
injury or death, he or she is a danger to other passen-
gers. 70 For example, the infant killed in the Sioux City
Crash weighed thirty five-pounds. NTSB suggests that an
unrestrained child weighing this much "represents a ma-
jor contradiction in the FAA regulations that require all
other 'items of mass' such as carry on baggage to be
stowed for take-off and landing."17' FAA administrator
James B. Busey admits that "forces generated by a crash
can exceed the parents ability to restrain a child safely,
and additionally, that in encounters with severe air turbu-
lence, high forces pose a potential danger to unrestrained
infants. ", 72
III. PROPOSED LEGISLATION
Both the House and the Senate have introduced legisla-
tion seeking to mandate safety restraints for children
travelling on aircraft. On February 20, 1990, Representa-
tive Jim Lightfoot introduced a bill mandating that child
safety restraints be required on all United States commer-
cial aircraft.73 Acknowledging the realities of both the
United Airlines Flight 232 crash in Sioux City and the Avi-
- Henretig, supra note 17, at 20; see also Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7, at
125 (statement of Anthony J. Broderick, Associate Director for Regulation and
Certification, FAA). Broderick remarked, "the use of a child safety seat can in-
crease the likelihood of [a] child surviving a crash .... The FAA believes that child
safety seats should be used." Id.
9 Birnbaum, supra note 18, at 20 (quoting Bob Gibbons of Northwest Airlines).
70 NTSB, supra note 1, at 6.
71 Id.
72 Voluntary Child-Restraint Regulation Is Part of FAA's Proposed Rulemaking, AIR
SAFETY WEEK, Mar. 5, 1990, at 4, 4-5 [hereinafter Voluntary Child-Restraint
Regulation].
73 H.R. 4025, supra note 7. This bill reads:
Section 1. CHILD RESTRAINT SYSTEMS ON COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFr
(a) In General-Section 601 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958
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anca Airlines Flight 52 crash in Cove Neck, New York, as
well as the concerns of the NTSB, Lightfoot stressed that
virtually all experts agree that infants and small children
should be restrained during air travel, especially during
turbulence, landing and take-off.74  The Congressman
emphasized that evidence supporting this view has been
available for at least fifteen years. 75 Lightfoot introduced
House Resolution 4025 to the Public Works and Trans-
portation Subcommittee of the House Aviation
Committee:
It has long been recognized that adults should be re-
strained during turbulence, landing and take-off. Yet chil-
dren under age two are not required to be restrained.
There is no excuse for requiring coffee pots and corpses
to be restrained while leaving children under age two to
fly around the cabin-that's sheer lunacy. This issue has
been studied for years-now is the time to act. We can't
afford to wait. It's time to get our heads out of the
clouds.76
Senator Christopher Bond introduced legislation in the
Senate, Senate Bill 1913, which is identical to House Res-
olution 4025. 77 Senate Bill 1913 has an interesting his-
tory. Senator Bond originally introduced this bill in
(49 U.S.C. App. 1421) is amended by adding at the end the follow-
ing new subsection:
"(g)CHILD RESTRAINT SYSTEMS.-Not later than 90 days
after the date of the enactment of this subsection, the Secretary shall
issue regulations requiring the use of child safety restraint systems
approved by the Secretary on aircraft providing air transportation of
passengers. Such regulations shall establish age or weight limits for
children who are to use systems."
Id.
7 Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7, at 19-20 (statement of Rep. Jim
Lightfoot).
75 d.
76 Id. at 19.
77 Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7, at 6 (statement of Sen. Christopher
Bond). Senate Bill 1913 reads exactly as House Resolution 4025, but it adds the
following amendment:
(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.-The table of contents con-
tained in the first section of such Act is amended by inserting at the
end of the matter relating to section 601 the following new item:
"(g) Child Restraint Systems"
1991] 213
214 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [57
November 1989 as an amendment to Senate Bill 341, the
Air Travel Rights for Blind Individual's Act. 78 For unclear
reasons, the Senate removed Senate Bill 341 from its cal-
ender of pending business on June 12, 1990.7 9 Conse-
quently, the Senate also removed the Bond amendment
from consideration." However, Senator Bond later rein-
troduced the child safety restraint legislation as Senate
Bill 1913.1 The Bill passed the Senate on August 2,
1990.82
Support for this legislation is widespread and emanates
from many groups, including the NTSB, the Air Trans-
port Association (ATA), the Flight Attendants Associa-
tion, the Airlines Passenger Association, parents, safety
experts, medical groups, and the commercial airlines.8 5
The Flight Attendants Association expresses a sentiment
which exemplifies the position of these organizations.
The FAA has gone to the trouble of regulating carry on
bags. They ought to do at least the same for infants....
An infant held on the floor is not likely to stay in place
during a crash .... in some circumstances [a safety seat]
can make the difference between life and death."4
The most active support for the legislation comes from
the NTSB and the ATA. These two organizations have
formally recommended that the FAA promulgate air craft
SECTION 2.-INTERNATIONAL STANDARD.
It is the sense of the Congress that the United States representa-
tive to the International Civil Aviation Organization should seek an
international standard to require that passengers on a civil aviation
aircraft be restrained on takeoff and landing and when directed by
the captain of such aircraft.
S. 1913, supra note 7, § 1(b), 2.
78 The Air Travel Rights For Blind Individual's Act, supra note 7.
79 Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7, at 9 (statement of Sen. Christopher
Bond); Parrish, Blind Rights Bill Off Senate Calendar, AIR SAFETY WEEK, June 18,
1990, at 3.
80 Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7, at 9-10 (statement of Sen. Christopher
Bond).
81 S. 1913, supra note 7.
82 136 CONG. REC. S12,015 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1990).
8s Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7, at 20-21 (statement of Rep. Jim
Lightfoot).
81 Weinhouse, supra note 25, at 132.
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regulations requiring children to be restrained in safety
devices during air travel.8 5 In doing so, these two groups
note that abundant evidence demonstrates the need for
child restraint systems.86 The FAA has responded to this
evidence by approving restraints which comply with mo-
tor vehicle safety standards for use on aircraft and by al-
lowing their use in flight. However, there is still no FAA
requirement that children traveling by air must be re-
strained in safety seats. 8 In the absence of FAA action,
the NTSB and the FAA support a congressional legislative
solution. 9 House Resolution 4025 and Senate Bill 1913
seek to provide this solution.90
The only opposition to House Resolution 4025 and
Senate Bill 1913 comes from the FAA. 9 ' The FAA offers
several reasons why it believes this proposed legislation is
ill-founded. In the next two sections, this comment will
examine the positions of those who support and those
who oppose the child safety restraint legislation.
IV. SUPPORT FOR CHILD SAFETY RESTRAINTS
A. Safety Issues
1. An Attempt at a Safe Alternative
The NTSB recently expressed concern that the FAA has
not adequately addressed infant traveller protection since
o5 NTSB, supra note 1, at 7; ATA petition, supra note 3, at 5.
Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7, at 2 (statement of Rep. Jim Lightfoot).
"Virtually all experts agree that small children should be better restrained during
air travel." Id. at 1.
87 FAA, TECHNICAL STANDARD ORDER C-100, CHILD RESTRAINT SYSTEMS (1982)
[hereinafter 1982 TSO C- 1001; see also Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard, 49
C.F.R. § 571.213 (1990) [hereinafter FMVSS 2131 (FMVSS 213 was amended on
August 30, 1984 to certify child safety seats as suitable for both car and air travel
use); FAA, TECHNICAL STANDARD ORDER C-100a, CHILD RESTRAINT SYSTEMS
(1985) [hereinafter 1985 TSO C-100a]; Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7, at 20
(statement of Rep. Jim Lightfoot).
- Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7, at v.
s9 NTSB Probe Raises Anew the Question of Child Safety Restraints, supra note 7, at 2-
3. It is likely that FAA action will not take place. "[W]e do not have a very re-
sponsive FAA." 136 CONG. REC. S57,456 (daily ed. June 6, 1990).
so H.R. 4025, supra note 7; S. 1913, supra note 7.
9, Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7, at 21 (statement of Rep. Jim Lightfoot).
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1978, although child safety aboard aircrafts has long been
a problem facing the aviation industry.92 Following a
1978 United Airlines crash involving infant fatalities, the
NTSB recommended that the FAA expedite both research
and rulemaking in an effort to make air travel as safe as
possible for young children and infants. 93 In response,
the FAA issued a 1982 ruling permitting the use of some
automobile restraint devices on airplanes,94 and when
pressed by the NTSB, extended this permit in a 1985 rul-
ing to all child/infant seats acceptable under the Federal
Motor Vehicle Safety Standards Number 213.95 This
1985 ruling did not require infant seats nor did it require
that all commercial airlines accept the usage of the child
safety restraints.96 Since the 1985 ruling, more than four
air incidents involving injury or death to an unrestrained
infant have occurred. 97 The Air Transportation Associa-
tion of America (ATA) and the NTSB have responded to
the FAA's rulings.
The ATA, on behalf of its member airlines and in ac-
cordance with H.R. 4025, petitioned the FAA on February
22, 1990 "to initiate rulemaking to amend certain por-
tions of [Federal Aviation Rule] FAR 121.311 pertaining
to the restraint of persons who have not reached their sec-
ond birthday." 98 The FAA responded to the ATA's peti-
tion by expressing concern over the safety of infants
92 NTSB, supra note 1, at 3.
9 Id.; see also supra note 58 and accompanying text.
1982 TSO C-100, supra note 87; NTSB, supra note 1, at 3.
9 1985 TSO C-I00a, supra note 87; NTSB, supra note 1, at 3. The NTSB has
termed this response untimely. Id.
1985 TSO C-100a, supra note 87.
91 NTSB, supra note 1, at 3-4. These accidents include the 1987 Continental
Airlines crash at Stapleton International Airport in Denver, Colorado, in which
one infant died; the 1990 Avianca Airlines crash at Cove Neck, New York, in which
one child died and six were severely injured; the 1989 Sioux City, Iowa, crash in
which one infant died and others were severely injured; and the turbulence
problems experienced in January 1990 by an American flight near Puerto Rico in
which one infant suffered serious injuries. Other crashes and turbulence
problems have occurred since the 1985 FAA action. See supra notes 37-72 and
accompanying text.
98 ATA petition, supra note 3, at 1. The ATA suggests the following replace-
ment for 14 C.F.R. § 121.311:
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travelling on air planes and strongly advocating parental
use of child restraints.99 In fact, in testimony at an Octo-
ber 30, 1989 NTSB public hearing, an FAA official stated
"infants are best protected in an FAA approved infant/
child restraint system that [is] properly installed in a
seat."' 0 0 Despite this statement and other expressed con-
cerns, the FAA initiated a March 1, 1990 rule which did
not require or even encourage use of child safety seats
aboard aircraft. This ruling prohibited air carriers from
denying use of approved restraints to those seeking to use
them.' 0' The FAA's March 1 proposal did not satisfy the
ATA; therefore, the ATA vigorously supports and actively
SEATS, SAFETY BELTS, AND SHOULDER HARNESSES.
(a) No person may operate an airplane unless there are available
during the takeoff, en route flight, and landing,
(1) An approved seat or berth for each person on board the
airplane; and
(2) An approved safety belt for separate use by each person on
board the airplane, ...
(b) During the takeoff and landing of an airplane, each person on
board shall occupy an approved seat or berth with a separate safety
belt properly secured about him.
Id. at 2.
55 Fed. Reg. discussion, supra note 35, at 7415.
Ioo NTSB, supra note 1, at 4.
, Miscellaneous Operational Amendments, 55 Fed. Reg. 7415 (1990)(to be
codified at 14 C.F.R. § 91.107)(proposed March 1, 1990)[hereinafter 55 Fed. Reg.
proposed rule]. Practically, this proposal is no different from the 1958 TSO, C-
100a. See supra note 87. Child restraint systems are still optional. 55 Fed Reg.
discussion, supra note 35, at 7416. The FAA's latest proposal purports to clarify
the option parents have of bringing a child restraint for their child on board an
aircraft. The proposed rule, 14 C.F.R. § 91.107 reads in pertinent part:
[a] Unless otherwise authorized by the Administrator-
(3) Except as provided in this paragraph, each person on board a
U.S. registered aircraft.., must occupy an approved seat or berth
with a safety belt and, if installed shoulder harness, properly secured
about him during movement on the surface, takeoff, and landing.
However, notwithstanding the preceding requirements of this para-
graph, a person may:
(i) Be held by an adult who is occupying a seat or berth if that
person has not reached his second birthday;
(ii) ...
(iii) Notwithstanding any other requirement of this chapter, oc-
cupy an approved child restraint system furnished by the operator or
one of the persons described in paragraph (a)(3)(iii)(A) of this sec-
tion provided that:
(A) The person is accompanied by a parent, guardian or per-
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advocates Representative Lightfoot's legislation. °2
The March 1, 1990, FAA ruling did not please the
NTSB either. The Safety Board announced that voluntary
use of child safety seats was not an appropriate means of
ensuring infant safety aboard aircraft. 0 3  On May 30,
1990, the NTSB officially recommended to the FAA that
child safety restraint systems be mandated for all infant/
children travelers.10 4
son (attendant) designated by the child's parent or guardian to at-
tend to the safety of the child during the flight;
(B) The approved child restraint system, depending upon its
date of manufacture, bears either one or two labels as follows:
(1) Seats manufactured between January 1, 1981 and Feb-
ruary 25, 1985, must bear the label: "This child restraint system con-
forms to all applicable Federal motor vehicle safety standards."
(2) Vest- and harness-style child restraint systems manufac-
tured before February 26, 1985, are not approved. Seats manufac-
tured on or after February 26, 1985 must bear two labels:
i. "This child restraint system conforms to all applicable
Federal motor vehicle safety standards"; and
ii. "THIS RESTRAINT IS CERTIFIED FOR USE IN
MOTOR VEHICLES AND AIRCRAFT"; and
(C) The operator complies with the following requirements:
(1) The restraint system must be properly secured to an
approved seat or berth;
(2) The person must be properly secured in the restraint
system and must not exceed the specified weight limit for the re-
straint system; and
(3) The restraint system bears the appropriate label(s).
[b] The operator may refuse to permit use of a restraint system that
has an obvious defect and, in the operator's judgment, may not func-
tion properly.
55 Fed Reg. proposed rule, at 7423.
102 ATA Petition, supra note 3, at 3. See also Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7,
at 19 (statement of Rep. Jim Lightfoot).
l0S NTSB, supra note 1, at 4.
Id. at 7. The recommendation is:
Revise 14 CFR 91, 121, and 135 to require that all occupants be
restrained during takeoff, landing, and turbulent conditions, and
that all infants and small children below the weight of 40 pounds
and under the height of 40 inches be restrained in an approved child
restraint system appropriate to their height and weight.
Conduct research to determine the adequacy of aircraft seatbelts to
restrain children too large to use child safety seats and to develop
some suitable means of providing adequate restraint for such
children.
Id. The FAA has not responded to this recommendation with a ruling for
2. Dissatisfaction with the FAA 's 1990 Ruling
The supporters of mandatory child safety seats cite nu-
merous reasons for their displeasure with the FAA's
March 1, 1990 rule proposal which leaves the use of child
restraint systems aboard aircraft to the parent's discre-
tion. First, the groups stress the documented risk to chil-
dren who travel unrestrained on aircraft.
Although parents on current airline flights are instructed
to hold the infant under two years of age on their lap,
from an occupant protection viewpoint clasping the child
in the mother's or father's arms offers virtually no protec-
tion at all in the impact deceleration of a crash, or even in
severe turbulence inflight.'1 5
Ironically, overwhelming indications of this risk come
from the FAA itself. In 1989, the Civil Aeromedical Insti-
tute (CAMI) undertook a research and development pro-
gram for the FAA, evaluating the performance of
approved infant/child restraint systems under a series of
dynamic test conditions. The tests involved the use of two
dummies, one representing a six month old child and the
other a two year old child. The dummies were placed in
child restraints and attached to aircraft seats. The test .re-
sults clearly indicate that the restrained infant and child
could survive severe forces, including those exerted dur-
ing turbulence and airline crashes. 0 6 The test further
shows that the typical airline seatbelt adequately protects
children over age two, but is grossly inappropriate for
children two and under.'0 7 Moreover, a Harvard Univer-
sity study concluded that unrestrained infant passengers
experience a higher risk of injury and death than do re-
mandatory child restraint systems aboard aircraft. Child Restraint Hearings, supra
note 7, at 12 (statement of Sen. Christopher Bond).
o5 Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7, at 1 (statement of Rep. Jim Lightfoot);
see also Snyder, supra note 4, at 90, 95; see supra notes 18-20 and accompanying
text.
oo FAA-CAMI REPORT, supra note 18, at 1; see also ATA petition, supra note 3, at
attachments B and C.
107 Id. at 3.
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strained adults. 0 8 The study suggests that the excess risk
to unrestrained passengers is related to a lack of mechani-
cal restraint systems. 0 9
Second, the groups supporting child safety restraints
aboard aircraft indicate that an unrestrained child faces
two serious hazards during an aircraft crash or severe tur-
bulence. First, the child faces the danger of striking the
aircraft interior on impact." 1 0 Second, the lack of child re-
straint systems could cause the death of both the unre-
strained child and his parent if the child is lost aboard a
downed aircraft during a crash."' During impending
crashes, parents are instructed to place their children on
the floor and brace them with their feet." 2 If a child sur-
vives the impact of a crash, there is a strong possibility
that he will not stay at the feet of his parent but will in-
stead slide or "fly" to another part of the plane." 3 The
loss of the child may hinder a parent from promptly evac-
uating himself or his child from the aircraft. As parents
search for their lost infants, the death rate aboard a
downed airplane can increase dramatically.' "4
Not surprisingly, numerous professional groups
staunchly advocate mandatory child safety restraints
aboard aircraft. For example, the American Academy of
Pediatricians' (AAP) Committee on Accident and Poison
Prevention has expressed concern over the lack of child
restraints used on aircraft." 5 The Committee reviewed
the available medical literature on the subject of the safety
108 Fife, supra note 5, at 1245.
Id. at abstract.
10 Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7, at 80 (statement of Susan Bianchi-Sand,
President, Association of Flight Attendants).
, Id. at 81.
112 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
,,- Child Restraints, supra note 7, at 81 (statement of Susan Bianchi-Sand); Sioux
City Crash Puts Heat on FAA, SAFE RIDE NEws, Fall 1989, at 2. This hazard was
demonstrated in the Sioux City Crash when a child slid from between his mother's
legs and perished in the crash's fire. Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7, at 79
(statement of Jan Brown, Flight Attendant, United Air Lines Flight 232).
114 See Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7, at 79 (statement of Susan Bianchi-
Sand, President, Association of Flight Attendants). Id. at 81.
" Henretig, supra note 17, at 1.
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of children under the age of two on aircraft and inter-
viewed numerous safety experts." 16 The Committee con-
cluded that the relative risk of infant mortality during an
airline crash far exceeds the similar risk to an adult, attrib-
uting this difference to the lack of adequate infant/child
safety mechanisms." 7 As a result, the Committee and the
American Academy of Pediatricians actively support legis-
lation mandating child safety restraints on aircraft." 8 The
Aviation Consumer Action Project, a non-profit consumer
organization which spends one hundred per cent of its ef-
forts on aviation issues, also supports mandating child re-
straints on aircraft.' 9 After surveying an enormous
amount of material, this group concluded that unre-
strained infants face extreme danger during air travel. 2 0
Numerous other groups also support the legislative pro-
posal mandating child safety restraints. 12
Proponents of mandatory child restraint systems fur-
ther contend that the FAA ignores benefits which child re-
straints will provide in addition to saving lives. 2 2 For
example, they argue that legislation mandating child
safety restraint systems will eliminate current airline con-
fusion concerning when and how to protect a child aboard
an aircraft and prevent airlines from refusing to allow par-
ents to use child restraint systems aboard a flight. 23
Confusion arises among parents preparing for a crash
as to the best method of protecting their children. For
example, in the Sioux City crash, flight attendants en-
couraged parents to place their children on their laps,
116 Id.
117 Id. "The [American Academy of Pediatrics] Committee [on Accident and
Poison Prevention] believes that all infants and young children should be re-
strained during air travel in a child safety seat .... Id.
I1i Id. In fact, the committee now advises AAP members to tell their air travel-
ling patients to fly only with children properly restrained. Id.
119 Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7, at 85 (statement of ChristopherJ. Wit-
koWski, Executive Director, Aviation Consumer and Action Project).
1- Id. at 85-87.
121 Id. at 20-21 (statement of Rep. Jim Lightfoot).
122 See, e.g., id. at vi.
,23 Id. at 7 (statement of Sen. Christopher Bond).
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while the captain instructed the parents to place their chil-
dren on the floor.'2 4 In addition, there is confusion
among parents as to what age child constitutes an infant.
Parents of toddlers over the age of two who have ade-
quate restraints in a typical seat with a seatbelt may inter-
pret an instruction to place infants on the floor as a
requirement seeking to ensure the safety of all young chil-
dren. 12 5 Frequently, parents who mistakenly remove their
children from either a child restraint or a seat to place
them in their lap or on the floor will expose the child to
increased danger. 2 6
The safety seats themselves inspire further confusion.
Both air carrier personnel and parents are uncertain
which safety seats are approved for airline travel.' 27 Few
parents are aware of FAA publications describing child
safety restraint systems acceptable for air travel. Due to
this lack of knowledge and the confusion it generates,
many parents opt to hold their children instead of placing
them in a safety seat. 2 8
Similarly, some misinformed air carrier personnel ad-
vise parents not to use a child restraint system, and others
refuse to allow their use.' 29 As a result, parents might be
able to use their restraint on one leg of a trip, but not on
another. 30 Often there is no place to store the forbidden
restraint system. 3 1 Moreover, airline personnel are fre-
quently unaware that placing a child in a restraint system
is safer than holding the child. One mother recalls being
allowed to leave her child in its safety seat during the
124 Michaelson, supra note 1. at 131.
12, NTSB, supra note 1, at 5.
126 Id. at 5-6. An incident during the Sioux City crash is illustrative. In that
crash, a parent placed a three year old child on the floor rather than leaving her in
her safety belt. The child subsequently died from her injuries.
127 Id. The FAA has certified FMVSS No. 213 approved child restraints as ac-
ceptable for aircraft travel. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
128 NTSB, supra note 1, at 6.
129 Michaelson, supra note 1, at 131; Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7, at 11
(statement of Sen. Christopher Bond).
," Younger, supra note 3, at 11-12.
, Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7, at 6 (statement of Sen. Christopher
Bond).
flight, but having to hold the child during takeoff, landing,
or when the fasten seatbelt light was lit.1 32 Ironically,
these are the most crucial times for the child to be in the
restraint system. ' 3 3
In an effort to eradicate the obvious confusion over
child safety restraints, the airline industry supports the
passage of legislation requiring child restraint systems on
aircraft. The industry lists numerous other reasons for of-
fering this support, the foremost of which is safety. As
Robert J. Aaronson, president of ATA, stated,
"[i]mproving safety for all passengers is a constant indus-
try goal and the regulation... [proposed] will make flying
safer for the estimated 5,000 to 10,000 infants who travel
in the laps of adults on commercial flights each day."'13 4
3. The Automotive Industry's Experience with Child Safety
Restraints
The need for automobile restraint devices for children
began to receive attention in the late 1950's. 3 5 By 1960,
the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) had formed
the Children's Restraint Committee to consider the desir-
ability of designing and implementing the use of child/
infant restraint systems.' 36 By the early 1970's, studies by
the SAE and the National Highway Traffic Safety Admin-
1-1 Michaelson, supra note 1, at 179; see also Snyder, supra note 4, at 83.
1 Fife, supra note 5, at 1245-46.
1- ATA Petition, supra note 3, at press release.
Snyder, supra note 4, at 82; Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7, at v.
Snyder, supra note 4, at 82. At about the same time, the Air Transport Cabin
Safety Provisions Committee of the Society of Automotive Engineers identified
the need for child restraint systems on board aircraft. This Committee's recogni-
tion of a child safety problem aboard aircraft was not as widely accepted as the
similar conclusion reached by the Children's Restraint Committee regarding
automobiles. Id. In February, 1990, the ATA sponsored a Child Restraint Confer-
ence. Among those attending were the ATA airlines, representatives from the
FAA Flight Standards, FAA-CAMI representatives, National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration representatives, NTSB representatives, the American Acad-
emy of Pediatrics, Aerospace Industries Association, Association of Flight Attend-
ants, manufacturers of child safety seats and university researchers. The
conference attendees decided to form a subcommittee under the auspices of a
committee of the Society of Automotive Engineers Aerospace. This new subcom-
mittee was assigned the task of modifying the infant/child safety mechanisms
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istration (NHTSA) revealed that approximately one thou-
sand children under the age of five were killed annually
during car accidents. 137 Ten thousand additional children
were severely injured in automobile accidents. 38 NHTSA
determined that most of these deaths and injuries could
be prevented if children were restrained so as to not "fly"
about the vehicle at impact. 39 In fact, mortality statistics
revealed that properly restrained children were better
protected from death and serious injury than were unre-
strained children. 40 While seatbelts were mandatory in
all cars manufactured after 1972,14 1 "[t]he size and fragil-
ity of infants and small children makes their use of safety
belts impractical ...., Grim statistics indicated that the
only appropriate way to protect a child travelling in an au-
tomobile was to strap him into an approved child safety
restraint seat.' 43 As a result of these determinations, the
NHTSA began actively encouraging child restraint usage
in all motor vehicles. 44 In 1971, the NHTSA established
standard Number 213 governing the manufacture, test-
ing, and usage of child restraint systems. 145 By 1980, this
standard was altered to reflect very stringent testing regu-
lations and usage standards for all motor vehicle child re-
straints. 46 Today, Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard
(FMVSS) 213 specifies requirements for child restraint
systems in both motor vehicles and aircraft. 147 "The pur-
pose of this standard is to reduce the number of children
designed for automobiles, to be more useful in an aircraft. Child Restraint Hearings,
supra note 7, at 4 (statement of Walter S. Coleman, Vice President, OATA).
137 43 Fed. Reg. 21,471 (1978).
138 Id. at 21,471.
1"9 Id.
14o Fife, supra note 5, at 1242.
14, 49 C.F.R. § 571.208(4.1) (1989).
,42 43 Fed. Reg., supra note 137, at 21,471.
143 Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7, at 4 (statement of Walter S. Coleman,
President, OATA).
14, 43 Fed. Reg., supra note 137, at 21,471.
145 Snyder, supra note 4, at 87.
'4" Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Child Restraint Systems, 45 Fed.
Reg. 29,045-48 (1980).
,, FMVSS 213, supra note 87.
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killed or injured in motor vehicle crashes and in air-
craft.' 48 Restraints passing the tests and standards of
Standard 213 represent the safest alternative for an infant
travelling by either car or plane. 49
One of the highest priorities of NHTSA is to increase
the number of young children occupying motor vehicles
who are routinely placed in protective child restraint sys-
tems. 50 Largely through the efforts of the NHTSA, all
fifty states and the District of Columbia presently require
and enforce the use of child safety restraints for children
travelling in cars who are under certain age or weight/
height standards.151
The Air Transport .Cabin Safety Provisions Committee
of the Society of Automotive Engineers contends that
children travelling in aircraft need just as much, if not
more, protection than children travelling in cars. 52 Each
piece of literature discussing the issue of child safety re-
straints aboard aircraft discusses the success of child
safety restraints in automobiles.- 3 The analogy seems
readily apparent. Indeed, as Robert J. Aaronson, presi-
dent of the Air Transport Association of America re-
marked, "[c]hild safety seats and seat belt use are
required in automobiles in all fifty states. If we buckle our
children up at 50 miles per hour, why not at 550 miles per
hour?"'-4
148 Id. § S2.
14 Snyder, supra note 4, at 87.
-w Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Child Restraint Systems, 53 Fed.
Reg. 24,394-97 (1988).
15, Id. at 24,395.
152 Snyder, supra note 4, at 82.
15 This includes materials put out by the FAA and appearing in the FAA's rule
proposal discussion on child safety restraints. See 55 Fed. Reg. discussion, supra
note 35, at 7415. See generally, Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7 (hearing ac-
cumulates a great deal of material pertaining to child restraint systems aboard
aircraft; there are many references to the fact that all fifty states require child re-
straint systems in automobiles).
- ATA Petition, supra note 3, at 1.
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B. The Equal Protection Argument
1. The Fourteenth Amendment
The fourteenth amendment to the United States Con-
stitution mandates that no state shall deny equal protec-
tion of the law to any person.' 55 Generally, this "equal
protection guarantee .. .governs all governmental ac-
tions which classify individuals for different benefits or
burdens under the law." 56 While the fourteenth amend-
ment contains other provisions, its equal protection
clause represents the most important protection of indi-
vidual rights in the Constitution. 57
The fourteenth amendment is one of three post civil
war amendments to the Constitution originally designed
to secure equal treatment for the newly free slaves.' 58 In
Strauder v. West Virginia, the Supreme Court described dis-
crimination against the newly freed slaves as "habitual,"
declaring the black race in need of "protection against un-
friendly action in the States where they are resident."'' 59
The equal protection clause became vital to ensuring that
laws were the same for all people, specifically the newly
55 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution provides in pertinent part:
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States
and of the State where in they reside. No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any per-
son within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appro-
priate legislation, the provisions of this article.
Id. §§ 1, 5.
- J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 523-24
(1986)[hereinafter NOWAK].
157 Id. at 524.
1-58 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). The Supreme Court de-
scribed this amendment as "one of a series of constitutional provisions having a
common purpose; namely securing to a race recently emancipated, a race that
through many generations had been held in slavery, all the civil rights that the
superior race enjoy." Id. at 306.
159 Id.
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emancipated black.' 60 Until the middle of the twentieth
century, courts interpreted this clause very narrowly, fol-
lowing the precedent of Strauder and offering equal pro-
tection only in cases of racial discrimination. 16 1 The equal
protection clause took on new importance with Supreme
Court cases decided while Earl Warren was Chief Jus-
tice. 162 During the 1960's, the Warren Court began to ap-
ply the equal protection clause to situations unrelated to
race. 6 3  The Court concluded that the clause prohibits
states from enacting legislation classifying persons in a
manner which creates an invidious discrimination against
a particular class." Simply put, the fourteenth amend-
ment guarantees that government classification of individ-
uals will not be based on impermissible criteria or
arbitrarily burden individuals. 65
2. Equal Protection as Applied to Federal Legislation
The fourteenth amendment on its face does not apply
to the federal government, but rather only to state and
local governments. 66 The Constitution does not contain
an equal protection clause governing federal activities and
legislation. 67 This apparent anomaly first received atten-
60 Id. at 309. Strauder specifically refers to equal protection for the newly eman-
cipated black race, stating "the law in the States shall be the same for the black as
for the white; that all persons, whether colored or white, shall stand equal before
the laws of the States .. " Id. at 307; see also G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN & C. SUNSTEIN,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 448 (1986)[hereinafter STONE].
16, Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court. A Model for a Newer
Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972). "At the beginning of the 1960's,
judicial intervention under the banner of equal protection was virtually unknown
outside racial discrimination cases." Id. Even prior to the 1930's, the Court en-
dorsed segregated facilities and other overt cases of a lack of equal protection
with the separate but equal doctrine. This was invalidated in 1954 with the court's
decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). NOWAK, supra note
156, at 555.
162 Gunther, supra note 161, at 8.
163 STONE, supra note 160, at 495; Gunther, supra note 161, at 8; see Harper v.
Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966)("notions of what consti-
tutes equal treatment for purposes of the equal protection clause do change").
- Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968).
163 NOWAK, supra note 156, at 525.
- Id. at 524.
167 Id. The omission of such a parallel clause has been termed anomalous. The
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tion in the 1950's when the Supreme Court began using
the equal protection clause in realms outside of racial dis-
crimination. 6  "The Supreme Court found a way to rem-
edy the [Constitutions's] textual omission, concluding
that the fifth amendment's due process clause prohibited
arbitrary discrimination by the federal government."'' 69
Basically, the Supreme Court handles equal protection
claims against the federal government just as it handles
equal protection claims against state governments. 70
The fifth amendment prohibits arbitrary discrimination by
the federal government in the same manner that the four-
teenth amendment prohibits discrimination by the
states. 7 ' Therefore, when examining federal legislation
for equal protection violations, the fourteenth amend-
ment equal protection clause arguments, cases, and
framers intended the fourteenth amendment to prevent racial discrimination.
However, it seems unlikely that the Congress itself would deem it necessary that it
be bound by an equal protection clause. Karst, The Fifth Amendment's Guarantee of
Equal Protection, 55 N.C.L. REV. 541, 541-4 (1977).
'8 Karst, supra note 167, at 542.
1 Id. The fifth amendment of the United States Constitution reads as follows:
"No person shall.., be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law...." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Supreme Court in Bolling v. Sharpe
recognized "discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due pro-
cess." 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). Boiling involved racial discrimination, declaring
the segregation of the District of Columbia's public schools unconstitutional.
This concept was extended to areas far beyond the initial application to racial
discrimination in the same manner as the extension of the fourteenth amend-
ment's equal protection clause. Karst, supra note 167, at 542; see also Weinberger
v. Wiensenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975)(fifth amendment equal protection claim ap-
plicable in a gender discrimination case involving a federal statute); Mathews v.
Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976)(Court examines treatment of the illegitimate by the
Social Security Act using the fifth amendment equal protection analysis).
170 Weinberger, 420 U.S. at 638 n.2 (1975). The fifth amendment's due process
clause prohibits the federal government from engaging in discrimination that is
.'so unjustifiable to be violative of due process." Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S.
498, 500 n.3 (1975) (citing Boling, 347 U.S. at 497, 499). The Court's approach
to fifth amendment equal protection has been precisely the same as its approach
to equal protection under the fourteenth amendment. Weinberger, 420 U.S. at 638
n.2 (1975).
17, Karst, supra note 167, at 545. Fifth amendment equal protection is justified
by both text and history. Id. at 547. See generally Karst, supra note 167 (discussion
of the historical overlaps of due process and equal protection and how they allow
the fifth and fourteenth amendments to be similarly interpreted).
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precedents control.172
3. Levels of Review
In guaranteeing that similarly situated people are
treated alike and those in different circumstances are not
treated as if they were the same, equal protection exam-
ines whether legislative classifications are properly
drawn.17 3 Classifications cannot be drawn in a manner in-
consistent with the fourteenth amendment. 74  Discrimi-
natory classifications may be upheld as constitutional only
if they relate to a proper governmental purpose with a
sufficient, clear state justification. 75 In determining the
propriety of federal or state legislative classifications, the
courts carefully examine each classification and the pur-
ported state justification. 176 A classification which meets
the equal protection guarantee serves a legitimate govern-
ment purpose and does not overly burden the identified
class. 77 The Supreme Court employs three tiers of re-
172 Karst, supra note 167, at 554. "In case after case, fifth amendment equal
protection problems are discussed on the assumption that fourteenth amendment
precedents are controlling." Id.; seeJohnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1977). In
Robison, the Court noted "if a classification would be invalid under the [e]qual
[pirotection [c]lause of the fourteenth amendment, it is also inconsistent with the
due process requirement of the fifth amendment." Id. at 364 n.4; see also Washing-
ton v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)(Court reviewed fourteenth amendment in re-
viewing this fifth amendment case involving racial discrimination); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)(sex discrimination case concerning the validity
of a federal statute in which the controlling precedent was a fourteenth amend-
ment equal protection decision); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628
(1974)(case involving discrimination against the illegitimate under a federal stat-
ute in which the court utilized fourteenth amendment equal protection authority).
See generally Karst, supra note 167, at 556 n.84.
'73 NOWAK, supra note 156, at 525.
174 Id. "A classification does not violate the guarantee when it distinguishes per-
sons as 'dissimilar' upon some permissible basis in order to advance the legitimate
interests of society." Id. The essential question is "whether this statutory differ-
entiation ... is justified by the promotion of recognized state objectives." Trim-
ble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 774 (1977).
,75Harper v. Virginia, 383 U.S. at 663, 665 (1966).
176 Id. at 670. The Court states in Harper, "[wie have long been mindful that
where fundamental rights and liberties are asserted under the equal protection
clause, classifications which might invade or restrain them must be closely scruti-
nized and carefully confined." Id.
'77 NOWAK, supra note 156, at 529. The essential question is a dual one: does
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view in deciding which classifications are justified. 78
The first type of review afforded to equal protection
questions is strict scrutiny.' 79 The Supreme Court applies
strict scrutiny when "statutory classifications approach
sensitive and fundamental personal ights ... ."180 Tradi-
tionally, strict scrutiny has been utilized only in cases in-
volving race and national origin.""' Over the past few
years, examination by strict scrutiny has been expanded to
other categories in which legislation limits fundamental
constitutional rights, classifies people with regard to their
ability to exercise a fundamental right, or bases the classi-
fication upon a "suspect trait."'18 2 In cases in which the
court uses strict scrutiny, the offending statute is upheld
only if it is necessary to promote a compelling or overrid-
ing government interest.8 3 These statutes are stricken in
all but the most extraordinary circumstances. l8 4
The second level of scrutiny which courts use in equal
protection cases is not formally labeled.'t 5  In recent
years, the Supreme Court has suggested a level of equal
the classification serve a legitimate purpose while not overly burdening the class?
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 504 (1976).
178 STONE, supra note 160, at 496.
"7 NOWAK, supra note 156, at 530.
lso Trimble, 430 U.S. at 767.
18, Mathews, 427 U.S. at 504.
,82 NOWAK, supra note 156, at 531. A suspect trait is one "which itself seems to
contravene established constitutional principles .... Id. A suspect classification
includes one based on race, national origin or alienage. Id. Some of the require-
ments for rendering a trait suspect are 1) the trait is not within the control of the
individual; and 2) the trait does not relate to the individual's ability to contribute
to or participate in society. Mathews, 427 U.S. at 505.
183 NOWAK, supra note 156, at 530; see, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 (1944)(Supreme Court ruled that laws excluding those of Japanese ancestry
from certain areas of the United States were constitutional within the war powers
of the executive, because of the compelling need to protect United States interests
during the war with Japan); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964)(Court
invalidated a law forbidding cohabitation between a black and white, noting that
there was no compelling state interest in punishing the promiscuity of one group
and not punishing other groups for similar behavior).
- Brest, In Defense of the Anti-discrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1976);
see, e.g., Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 214 (discriminatory statute justified in wartime).
,,5 See generally Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (case applies a standard
above that of rational basis but below strict scrutiny in determining that a statute
forbidding the sale of 3.2% beer to males under twenty and to females below age
COMMENTS
protection review which utilizes neither strict scrutiny nor
the rational basis'8 6 standards."8 7 This level of scrutiny
eliminates the presumption of constitutionality which ap-
pears in the rational basis standard, but requires that leg-
islation be substantially related to an important
governmental objective.'8 8
Finally, courts apply a rational relationship or rational
basis test to some equal protection issues.18 9 The Court
does not subject cases reviewed under this standard to
any significant examination.' 0 Using this standard of re-
view, the court will determine if it is possible that the clas-
sification has any rational relationship to an end specified
by the government that is not prohibited by the Constitu-
tion.' 9 ' Specifically, the Court has held, "[a]lthough no
precise formula has been developed, . .. [t]he constitu-
tional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests
on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the
state's objective."' 192 While it is possible to render a stat-
ute invalid using the rational basis standard, rational basis
review upholds many statutes. 9 3
4. Equal Protection and Child Restraint Systems
The Federal Aviation Regulations regarding safety seat
regulations involve a clear statutory classification. The
regulations statutorily include the class of adults and chil-
eighteen was unconstitutional on equal protection grounds because of gender
discrimination).
I-O See infra notes 188-192 and accompanying text.
187 NOWAK, supra note 156, at 531; see also Alabama State Federation of Teachers
v. James, 656 F.2d 193, 195 (5th Cir. 1981)(court described the traditional two
tier approach involving the standards for strict scrutiny and rational basis as
somewhat unsettled because of recent Supreme Court usage of a middle tier ap-
proach in decisions involving discrimination because of gender or illegitimacy).
'88 Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
189 NOWAK, supra note 156, at 532.
1- Id. at 530.
191 Id.
192 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1960). "A statutory discrimina-
tion will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify
it." Id. at 426.
'93 STONE, supra note 160, at 496.
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dren over the age of two, but exclude the class of infants
and children under the age of two. 94 In the aviation
safety restraint regulations, the federal government de-
nies passengers under the age of two the protection af-
forded the class of passengers over the age of two years of
age-the requirement of wearing seat belts. Conse-
quently, the statute is underinclusive; 95 it excludes a
group in need of the benefit and burden of its require-
ments. Essentially, "equal protection is not provided to all
aircraft passengers." 96
Equal protection principles are applicable to this under-
inclusive federal regulation. 97 In accordance with the
Supreme Court ruling that minors are "persons" within
the definition of person under the fourteenth amend-
ment,' 98 children under the age of two are entitled to
equal protection of all United States laws. Two ap-
proaches can be used to apply equal protection theory to
the regulations precluding children from equal protection
on aircraft.
First, the Court might determine that the regulation de-
serves strict scrutiny review. 99 As stated, strict scrutiny
applies to statutory classifications which infringe on fun-
damental personal rights.2 0 0 Denying adequate safety re-
quirements for young children denies them the right most
fundamental of all-the right to life. The Supreme Court
labels a right as fundamental by making "a judicial deter-
'- 14 C.F.R. § 121.311, supra note 16, §§ (a)-(b); id. § 91.14, supra note 16
§§ 2-3. Susan Coughlin, Vice Chairman of the NTSB, stated "unrestrained in-
fants and small children are not being offered the same level of protection as
other occupants, and objects.., on an airplane .... Child Restraint Hearings, supra
note 7, at 38.
'00 An underinclusive classification "includes a small number of persons who fit
the purpose of the statute but excludes some who are similarly situated." NOWAK,
supra note 156, at 527.
-96 Snyder, supra note 4, at 94.
,97 See supra notes 166-172 and accompanying text.
,98 Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977). "Minors, as well as
adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights." Id. at
692.
- See supra notes 179-184 and accompanying text.
2- See supra notes 180, 182 and accompanying text.
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mination that the text or structure of the Constitution evi-
dences the existence of a value" that should be closely
guarded.20 It is obvious that life is a fundamental per-
sonal right which is worthy of being closely guarded, and
the fourteenth amendment enforces this by forbidding
"any state [to] deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law .... -2o2 Further support
for the notion that life is a fundamental right comes from
the Declaration of Independence. This great document
refers to "all men being created equal, possessing inher-
ent, inalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness. °2 0 3 The founding fathers
presumed that protection should be afforded to each indi-
vidual's life, stating "every citizen shall hold his life, lib-
erty, property, and immunities, under the protection of
the general rules which govern society. ' 20 4 Clearly, the
protection of human life constitutes a fundamental
right 20 5 and, thus, any law infringing on the right to life or
putting the right to life in danger must be examined
under the strict scrutiny standard.
Federal Aviation Regulations 121.311 and 91.14206 put
the life of a child in danger by not requiring adequate
safety restraints. This violates equal protection because a
class of people is excluded from a fundamental protection
mandated upon a larger class. In order to be constitu-
2 1 NOWAK, supra note 156, at 532 n.21.
-2 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added); U.S. CONST. amend. V.
203 Declaration of Independence, prologue (U.S. 1776).
204 Karst, supra note 167, at 548 (quoting Daniel Webster) (emphasis added).
-5 The Supreme Court has labeled many rights and privileges as fundamental.
The Court has termed the right to vote a "fundamental matter in a free and demo-
cratic society." Harper, 383 U.S. at 667. Also, the Supreme Court has labeled the
right to procreate as fundamental, calling marriage and procreation fundamental
to the very existence and survival of the race. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. at 541.
Further, marriage has been held to be a fundamental right in itself. Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). In each of these cases, legislation denying these
rights was overturned using the strict scrutiny standard of review. Harper, 383
U.S. at 670; Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541; Loving, 388 U.S. at 11. Surely, since voting,
marriage, and childbearing are deemed fundamental, the right to life is funda-
mental as well.
2o See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
1991] 233
234 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [57
tional, this law must support a compelling state inter-
est. °7 However, it does not appear that there is such an
interest inherent in this law. The history of the law does
not indicate any governmental reason for excluding chil-
dren from its application. 0 8 Instead, the law states that
its purpose is to save lives.2 0 9 The law's denial of safety
requirements to infants is obviously arbitrary. 2 0 There is
no scientific research supporting the 1953 decision to ex-
clude those aged two and under from seat belt regula-
tions.2 1 ' There is no government interest explaining why
"infants and small children [were not] afforded equal or
greater protection from death and injury during crash im-
pacts and turbulence as afforded other persons on board
commercial and general aviation aircraft. ' 21 2 Clearly, the
absence of any government interest for an arbitrary, dis-
criminatory, and dangerous rule precludes a finding of a
compelling state interest. Federal Aviation Rules 121.331
and 91.14 are unconstitutional in that they deny equal
protection of the laws to children by threatening their
fundamental right to life.
In the unlikely event that the Court does not label the
protection of a child's life as a fundamental right, Federal
Aviation Rules 121.311 and 91.14 will not receive review
using a strict scrutiny standard. 1 However, the classifi-
cation inherent in Federal Aviation Rules 121.311 and
91.114 will still receive scrutiny using the rational basis
207 See supra note 183 and accompanying text. In other cases, justifications such
as administrative ease, convenience, reducing intrafamily conflict, and traffic
safety have been rejected as justifications for classifications. Craig, 429 U.S. at
198.
208 NTSB, supra note 1, at 4; Safety Recommendation Urges, supra note 15, at 1.
200 Cohen, supra note 30.
210 Cohen, supra note 30. In fact, the law was a random, discretionary choice in
which the age of two was simply drawn "from the sky." Id. A classification must
not be arbitrary. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). See generally Child Restraint
Hearings, supra note 14, at 84 (statement of Walter S. Coleman, Vice President,
OATA).
211 Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 14, at 84 (statement of Walter S.
Coleman).
212 NTSB, supra note 1, at 6-7.
21, NOWAK, supra note 156, at 537.
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standard. 214  Federal Aviation Rule 121.311 and 91.114
contain an age discrimination factor in that children
under the age of two are denied the protection that the
law offers those of other ages. Age discrimination has
been subject of meaningful Supreme Court review. 15 In
order for a federal classification which results in age dis-
crimination to be labeled constitutional, the rule must be
rationally and reasonably related to a legitimate state
goal. 216 The Supreme Court does not seem willing to
strike down legislation using this standard of review
"as long as it is conceivable that the classification might
promote a legitimate governmental interest. '2 17 As stated
previously, there is no government interest served by Fed-
eral Aviation Rule 121.311 and 91.114's denial of man-
dated safety precautions to children under two. 218 Even
using the rational basis review, Federal Aviation Rules
121.311 and 91.114 are likely to be deemed
unconstitutional.
5. Equal Protection and Handicapped Travellers
Recently Congress has enacted legislation to provide
equal protection aboard aircrafts to another class of pas-
sengers: disabled travelers. The Air Carrier Access Act of
1986 219 includes a variety of requirements to "ensure that
handicapped persons receive adequate air transportation
214 See supra notes 189-193 and accompanying text. "The Court employs the
traditional rational basis test when the classification to be tested does not involve
a fundamental right, and does not employ the characteristics of race, national ori-
gin, citizenship, sex, or legitimacy of birth to define the benefited or burdened
class." NOWAK, supra note 156, at 537.
215 See Carey, 431 U.S. at 691-96 (Supreme Court invalidates a law prohibiting
the sale of contraceptives to persons under the age of sixteen on the ground that
it discriminates against minors).
2160reskes,Judge Voids State's Age Limit for Police, N. Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1984, at
B3, col. 4 (citing judge T. Curtin, D.C. of Buffalo); see also, Izquierdo v. Mercado,
894 F.2d 467 (1990)(court examined an aged-based demotion in terms of its ra-
tional relationship to a legitimate goal-the government need only show a ra-
tional basis for applying age related criteria).
217 NOWAK, supra note 156, at 537.
218 See supra notes 206-212 and accompanying text.
219 Air Carrier Access Act, 14 C.F.R. § 382 (1990).
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service, without unjust discrimination based on handicap,
and to implement section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, which is designed to eliminate discrimination on the
basis of handicap in any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance. 22 0
Prior to the passage of this law, disabled individuals
challenged instances in which they were discriminated
against because of their handicap and not afforded the
same access to aircraft and the same safety precautions of-
fered to other passengers. 2 '
In 1976, the Supreme Court decided a case, United States
Department of Transportation v. Paralyzed Veterans of America
(PVA), 22 2 which led to the passage of the Air Carrier Ac-
cess Act. 2" In PVA, the Supreme Court refused to hold
that certain Civil Aeronautics Board regulations which vi-
olated section 504 of The Rehabilitation Act2 24 of 1973
were discriminatory. 225 The Supreme Court held that sec-
tion 504's prohibition against discriminating against the
handicapped applied only to organizations receiving direct
federal financial assistance.226 The Paralyzed Veterans of
America contended that the aviation industry received
such assistance through federally funded airports and fed-
eral air traffic control systems.227 However, the Supreme
220 Id. at § 382.1.
221 See Hingson v. Pacific Southwest Airlines, 743 F.2d 1408 (9th Cir.
1984)(court held that handicapped passengers who are discriminated against by
air carriers may recover damages); Angel v. Pan American World Airways, 519 F.
Supp. 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1981)(court noted a handicapped traveler was discrimi-
nated against by being denied access to an air carrier). These cases involved the
criteria of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 [hereinafter Act 504], an
act which provides special protection for the disabled from discrimination by a
program receiving federal money. S. REP. No. 400, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1986).
The decisions examined aspects similar to those in the child safety equal protec-
tion issue, for example reasonableness, arbitrariness, and safety. Since the Air
Carrier Access Act purports to give effect to Act 504, these cases offer some
authority.
222 477 U.S. 597 (1986).
22- S. Rep. No. 400, supra note 221, at 1.
224 See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
225 PVA, 477 U.S. at 603.
226 Id. at 605.
227 Id. at 597, 606-7, 611.
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Court did not label this assistance direct federal financial
assistance. 2 8 This case effectively, "free[d] large air carri-
ers from the discrimination prohibitions of the Rehabilita-
tion Act22 9 of 1973. ''230 The practical effect of PVA was to
authorize unequal, discriminatory treatment of handi-
capped travelers by the air carriers. 23 ' The Air Carrier
Access Act of 1986 mitigated the harm that the unequal
protection authorized in PVA caused by prohibiting dis-
crimination "in the provision of air transportation against
an otherwise qualified handicapped individual by reason
of such handicap. ' 23 2 Basically, the handicapped are now
assured the same access to aircraft and safety while
aboard aircraft which are available to other travelers.
Like the disabled, small children deserve the same
rights aboard aircraft as are afforded to other air travelers.
These rights include the safety precautions mandated to
others travelling by air. As stated during a summary by
Senator Bond on the floor of the Senate:
[c]urrent policy gives airlines the discretion to allow or
prohibit the use of child safety seats for children under the
age of two. As a result, most toddlers and infants travel in
a parent's lap. And when they do, they face a much higher
risk of injury or death because the force of a crash or even
severe turbulence completely overwhelms the parent's
ability to restrain him. Why do we require restraints for
an infant's family-his parents and brothers and sisters-
but not for him? Why are airlines required to tie down
and secure every single item in the cabin before takeoff-
luggage, liquor, food, and coffee pots-but not babies? I
228 Id. at 609, 612.
2- See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
23- S. REP. No. 400, supra note 221, at 2.
231 Id.
232 14 C.F.R. § 382 supra note 219, § 382.1(1).
Otherwise qualified individual is intended to ... [mean] one who
tenders payment for air transportation; whose carriage will not vio-
late FAA regulations; and who is willing and able to comply with
reasonable, safety requests of airline personnel or, if not, is accom-
panied by a responsible adult passenger who can ensure compliance
with the requests.
S. REP. No. 100, supra note 221, at 4.
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find it outrageous that this helpless group of travelers is
denied the same protection as adults and inanimate
objects.233
Today's technology provides parents with excellent in-
fant and child safety seats, making it possible to provide
every child, regardless of age with the "same level of pro-
tection which is provided to adults" while flying on an air-
craft.y 4 The proposed Congressional legislation seeks to
eliminate parental discretion with regard to restraining
their young children by making restraints mandatory for
young children. 3 5 In this manner, the aviation industry
will comply with the Constitution by providing equal pro-
tection from death and severe injury to all air travelers.
Indeed, "[i]f infant seats are not required, we will con-
tinue to treat our children as second class citizens. 2 3 6
V. THE OPPOSITION TO CHILD SAFETY RESTRAINTS
A. The Argument Concerning Cost Effectiveness
The major opponent to a law mandating the use of
child restraint systems aboard commercial aircraft is the
FAA.2 3 The FAA cites several reasons why requiring chil-
dren to be restrained aboard aircraft is not a good idea.
The proponents of mandatory child restraint systems
counter each of these arguments.
The focus of the FAA's objection involves the economic
cost allegedly inherent in the proposed mandate s.2 3  The
FAA's "preliminary analysis of the potential costs of a
mandatory rule indicates a significant economic cost. '23 9
233 136 CONG. REC. S12,014 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1990).
24 ATA Petition, supra note 3, at 2.
235 Id. at 3.
236 Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7, at 15 (statement of Sen. Christopher
Bond).
237 Id. at 21 (statement of Rep. Jim Lightfoot).
238 Id.
239 55 Fed. Reg. discussion, supra note 35, at 7416. The FAA estimates the an-
nual cost of a child restraint requirement to be over two hundred million dollars.
Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7, at 67 (statement of Anthony J. Broderick,
Associate Administrator for Regulation and Certification, FAA); NTSB Probe Raises
Anew the Question of Child Safety Restraints, supra note 7, at 2.
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There are several aspects to this economic cost.
First, the FAA believes that the rule requires the fami-
lies with children under the age of two years to pay for the
cost of a seat while under present law, these children ride
for free on the laps of their parents. 240  Estimates of the
increased cost per family per trip range from $62.50 by
the FAA24' to $185.00 by other economists. 4 2 In re-
sponse to this argument the proponents of child restraint
systems make several points. First, any cost analysis esti-
mations by the FAA are speculative; it is extremely diffi-
cult to predict if or how much the airlines will charge for
children under two to occupy a restraint seat on board a
plane. 43 An ATA official expected an array of different
fares to be offered, "I can't imagine they won't take a
close look at what effect charging for those seats might
have on family travel. You don't want to price yourself
2- 55 Fed. Reg. discussion supra note 35, at 7416.
241 Id The FAA estimate reads as follows:
The FAA estimates that the average price for a U.S. scheduled do-
mestic flight is $103.78 (in 1989 dollars) and a U.S. scheduled for-
eign flight is $281.82. The weighted average for these two is
$118.30 per flight. The FAA assumes that half of the average price
would be charged for children under 2, which is the same as the
policy followed by some airlines for children between 2 and 5 years
of age. Half of the $118.30 per flight is $59.15 per flight, and this
would be the most significant additional cost for children 2 and
under because of a mandatory child restraint rule.
Id. The FAA includes in this cost basis a three dollar fee for the use of a child
restraint seat, noting that the major automobile rental companies charge an aver-
age of three dollars a day for the use of a child restraint. 55 Fed. Reg. discussion,
supra note 35, at 7416. The FAA estimates the total family fare to equal two full
fares and one half fare. Using the average 1989 fares, this will cost $295.75. Ad-
ding three dollars a day for a mandatory child restraint, the price per family will
increase by $62.15, with the total family price jumping to $357.90, a twenty one
percent price increase. Id.
242 Waters, supra note 15, at 70. Waters discusses a cost analysis similar to that
in note 241, but involving the use of larger numbers. See also, Child Restraint Hear-
ings, supra note 7, at 66 (statement of Anthony J. Broderick, Associate Administra-
tor for Regulation and Certification, FAA).
243 Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7, at 17, 21 (statement of Rep. Jim
Lightfoot). Lightfoot argues that House Resolution 4025 is "intentionally worded
in the least intrusive manner possible for a mandatory rule .. " It does not
address the question of charges for the child under the age of two. Id. at 22.
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out of that.12 44 The proposed legislation does not ad-
dress what amount airlines should charge for a seat occu-
pied by an infant. 4 5 However, it is in the airlines' best
interest to keep family flying affordable. 46 The airlines
might institute family fare plans or establish a scale of dif-
ferent fares for the same aircraft.247 Even FAA adminis-
tratorJames B. Busey admits "airline marketing strategies
would probably play a role here. '248
Second, the FAA contends that mandating child re-
straint systems will require the airlines to purchase the re-
straint systems at a considerable cost to the airline
industry.249 In this regard, the FAA considered the costs
244 NTSB Recommends FAA Require Child Safety Seats on Aircraft, Av. WEEK AND
SPACE TECH., May 28, 1990, at 117.
-' Child Restraint Heartings, supra note 7, at 22 (statement of Rep. Jim Lightfoot).
246 NTSB Recommends FAA Require Child Safety Seats on Aircraft, supra note 244, at
117. The airlines have a history of offering incentive programs and fares so that
families can fly together. There is no evidence to suggest this will not continue in
the event that child restraint seats become mandatory. Child Restraint Hearings,
supra note 7, at 88, 94 (statement of Walter S. Coleman, Vice President, OATA).
Presumably, the airlines will make available special option packages, including
family rates, the half price option presently offered to infants age two to three,
and even a continued free policy. Id. at 7 (statement of Sen. Christopher Bond).
At present, many U.S. airlines will permit children under the age of two to fly
using child safety seats in an unoccupied seat free of charge. Id. This may con-
tinue. Id. However, a simple continuation of this policy will not be appropriate
for solving the overall child restraint problem. Often flights are full to their ca-
pacity and parents do not have the option of waiting for the next flight. So, they
risk their child's life by not restraining him. Mortality among Infant Passengers on
Airlines, 72 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 497 (1982). When child safety restraints become
mandatory on aircraft, the airlines will seek to keep families flying through innova-
tive pricing. Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7, at 59 (statement of Susan M.
Coughlin, Vice Chairman, NTSB).
It is interesting to examine the argument that legislation is unnecessary today
because air travel has become much safer in recent years and few children fly as
proposed by those who oppose mandatory child restraints aboard aircraft in light
of their corresponding argument that airlines will lose money if restraints are re-
quired. See infra notes 276-296 and accompanying text. If so few children fly that
this problem is obsolete, why will the airlines not let the children continue to ride
for free with their child restraints? It is entirely possible, that the airlines will
make this pricing choice. Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7, at 7 (statement of
Sen. Christopher Bond). The proponents of mandatory child restraints contend
that the problem is far from obsolete, but the apparent contradiction inherent in
arguments espoused by the legislation's opponents is interesting nonetheless.
247 Airline Infant Safety Seats Required, supra note 3, at 17.
248 Safety Recommendation Urges, supra note 15, at 2.
249 55 Fed. Reg. discussion, supra note 35, at 7416.
of putting two or three child restraints on each of 2,500
commercial aircraft, incurring a cost of approximately
$250,000 to $375,000 per year.250 The proposed legisla-
tion does not purport to place this burden on the airline
industry.2 5' House Resolution 4025 leaves the manner in
which the restraints are provided for each applicable pas-
senger to the discretion of the airline. 52 The most logical
solution appears to be that each parent will provide his or
her own safety seat, utilizing the FMVSS approved seat
used when travelling by automobile. Indeed, this is the
intention of the FAA's proposed ruling which makes the
use of safety seats optional.2 5 3 This solution costs the air-
lines nothing. Pet transportation aboard aircraft is analo-
gous. Many airlines transport animals. Under most
regulations, each pet owner must provide his or her own
"approved" pet carrier. Most owners already own a car-
rier and may use it aboard the aircraft. This requirement
has not prohibited airlines from allowing people to trans-
port animals. Ironically, "an on board pet is safer in the
protective confines of a required pet carrier than is an un-
restrained child. '2 54  The same regulatory framework
which allows passengers to transport their animals safely
can be successfully applied to child safety restraints. Par-
ents who already own a FMVSS car seat can simply bring
it on the plane. Because most parents already own an ap-
proved restraint, neither the airline nor the passengers
will have to purchase a safety seat.255
250 FAA, COST RESTRAINT SYsTEMs ACCEPTABLE FOR USE IN AIRCRAFT MEMORAN-
DUM (June 10, 1982).
251 House Resolution 4025, supra note 7; S. 1913, supra note 7. The proposed
legislation seeks to restrain children; it does not seek to have the airline acquire
child restraints for aircraft seats. Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7, at 89 (state-
ment of Walter S. Coleman, Vice President, OATA).
252 Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7, at 22 (statement of Rep. Jim Lightfoot).
255 55 Fed. Reg. discussion, supra note 35, at 7416-17. The FMVSS approved
seats now read "approved for auto and air travel." See supra note 87 and accompa-
nying text.
25 Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7, at 78 (statement of Jan Brown, flight
attendant, United Air Lines Flight 232).
2.5 Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7, at 14 (statement of Sen. Christopher
Bond).
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Third, the FAA emphasizes the alleged huge revenue
loss House Resolution 4025 will mean to the commercial
airline industry. The FAA estimates that approximately
four million children age two and under travel aboard
U.S. airlines yearly. 56 The FAA assumes that the average
infant is accompanied by two adults and at least one sib-
ling.257 With the introduction of the proposed legislation,
the FAA estimates that the annual number of travelling
children will be 3,310,000, a loss of 700,000 young travel-
ers.25 8 This loss will result in a $211,716,500 loss in ticket
revenues from the family members who would ordinarily
accompany the 700,000 children as paying passengers.259
In addition, the FAA argues that families who will not be
able to afford to fly will experience a non-monetary loss if
House Resolution 4024 becomes law. 2 6  Again, these es-
timates are speculative. 6' Moreover, the proposed legis-
lation appears to adequately address the alleged financial
consequences to the airlines. The cost to the airlines
should not be a factor precluding the passage of child re-
straint legislation, primarily because family programs and
incentives will allow families to continue flying.2 62 The
support of the Air Transportation Association, an organi-
zation composed of commercial airlines, suggests that air-
lines generally support mandatory child restraints. Surely
their support indicates that solutions to any alleged ticket
price increases exist, and, thus, that loss to the industry is
unlikely.26 3
2- 55 Fed. Reg. discussion, supra note 35, at 7416.
25 Id. This is a large generalization and probably an incorrect one on the part
of the FAA. Documented statistics show that the nuclear family used by the FAA
in its calculations is no longer the typical family type in the United States.
2- 55 Fed. Reg. discussion, supra note 35, at 7416.
259 Id.
2W Id.
261 See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
262 See supra notes 246-47 and accompanying text.
26s ATA Petition, supra note 3, at 3. In fact, some opponents of this legislation
indicate that "the airline industry's support of the proposed regulation is under-
standable, although objectionable. If adopted, the new regulation would enable
airlines to suppress important competitive forces and sell millions more seats each
year." McKenzie & Lee, supra note 11, at 1. It is unlikely that the airlines will
COMMENTS
In addition to the specific arguments already men-
tioned, proponents of House Resolution 4025 raise sev-
eral general objections to the preceding arguments
espoused by the FAA. The foremost issue is safety, not
cost.2 64 The United States legal system has already mea-
sured the value of human life against cost saving meas-
ures. In Grinuhaw v. Ford Motor Co.,265 the court held that
the value of even one life far outweighed any efforts or
cost it took to save that life. 266 In Grimshaw, the producers
of the Ford Pinto hatchback eliminated certain safety
measures in order to produce an inexpensive car.267
These producers were fully aware of tests showing that
the car's design was dangerous.2 68  However, relying on
statistics showing low incidents of motor vehicle accidents
and a supposedly slight chance of someone suffering a fa-
tal accident, Ford decided to save money by sidestepping
a safety precaution.2 69 In a resulting wrongful death case,
the court found Ford liable for injuries incurred by pas-
sengers in a Pinto hatchback. 27 0 The value of even one
life was cited as more important than any economic bene-
fits. 2 7 ' This theory applies equally to infants and small
children travelling by air.272 Even if only one infant is
enjoy this windfall since they are more likely to work out package deals enabling
families to keep flying. See supra notes 246-47 and accompanying text. Still this is
an interesting contradiction among the opposition to House Resolution 4025.
Some opponents argue that the airlines will lose money, others argue the airlines
will make money.
26 Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7, at 21 (statement of Rep. Jim Lightfoot).
"If cost is the major concern, I think we are placing a price tag on a small child's
head and engaging in a game of Russian Roulette." Id. at 80 (statement of Susan
Bianchi-Sand, President, Association of Flight Attendants).
265 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Ct. App. 1981).
266 Id.
267 174 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
2 6 Id. at 360-61.
266 Id at 361-62.
270 Id at 358, 363.
271 Id at 368.
272 Representative James Obestar, chairman of the Subcommittee on Aviation
remarked,
We are trying to balance costs against benefits, but in this case, in
[sic] one thing to balance costs/benefit of an FDA regulation, or a
USDA regulation, or a 404 permit or a discharge permit under EPA,
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saved through proper safety precautions, the cost and ef-
fort expended has been deemed worthwhile.2 73 As James
L. Kolstad, NTSB Chairman stated, "I don't think that the
economic cost for protecting an infant's life is too much
to ask." 2
74
It is unlikely that cost will inhibit the passage of legisla-
tion making child restraint systems mandatory aboard air-
craft. However, should cost become a legitimate issue,
saving a human life far outweighs any economic consider-
ations involved. 75
B. The Argument of Obsolescence
The opponents of mandatory child restraint systems on
aircraft contend that the risk presented by air travel to un-
restrained infants is not severe enough to warrant legisla-
tion. In support of this view, opponents make several
arguments suggesting that the risk to unrestrained infants
aboard aircraft is obsolete. 276 For example, they observe
that as a result of the efforts of the NTSB and other safety
experts, air travel by commercial airlines grows safer each
year,277 and that severe aircraft accidents involving loss of
life are rare.278 James B. Busey, administrator for the
but in this area we are talking about a commodity that shouldn't
even bear that term, it is human life. What price tag do we put on
human life?
Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7, at 39.
27s Grimshaw, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 348. "No cost is too high if it means protecting
infants from injury and possible death." Bianchi-Sand statement, supra note 7, at
80 (statement of Susan Bianchi-Sand, President, Association of Flight
Attendants).
274 Safety Recommendations Urges, supra, note 15, at 2.
275 Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7, at 15 (statement of Sen. Christopher
Bond). "The fact is, safety has a cost. However, I submit that the lack of safety
carries the highest cost of all-loss of life." Id.
'276 Voluntary Child-Restraint Regulation, supra note 72, at 4. FAA administrator
James Busey sees only a slight statistical risk to unrestrained infants because there
are a small number of babies travelling and because accidents are rare. Id
277 Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7, at 37 (statement of Susan M. Coughlin,
Vice Chairman, NTSB).
278 Id. "The probability of survival following an air crash has improved in re-
cent years." Id. ATA petition, supra note 3, at 5. The FAA contends that the use
of child restraints should not be required aboard aircraft because accident and
incident rates are so low that there is only a small risk of injury to unrestrained
FAA, contends that air travel constitutes "a small statisti-
cal risk to unrestrained infants.... , 279 In support of this
contention, Mr. Busey indicates that commercial airline
crashes are infrequent and that they involve few chil-
dren.2 8 0 According to the projections of researchers eval-
uating the proposed effectiveness of child seats on crashes
over the past few years, baby seats will save the lives of
three children over a five year period .2 8  These research-
ers do not address the issue of severe injury to unre-
strained children. Calling this a small number of children
being saved, opponents of House Resolution 4025 view
the legislation as an unnecessary solution to an obsolete
problem. 2  They suggest that saving such a small
number of infants' lives is not worth the trouble of legis-
lating and implementing a law.
An analogy to the argument that child safety on aircraft
is an obsolete problem is present in the FAA regulation
regarding oxygen.28 3 Rarely, if ever, is oxygen needed
aboard flights.2  Yet, every commercial airline must have
an oxygen system,2s5 must periodically check this sys-
tem,28 6 and must provide instruction for its use on every
flight. 8 7 These rules are both time consuming and ex-
pensive for the airlines, and they address a problem which
is surely as "obsolete" as the risk of an unrestrained
child's death. 8 Still, despite the rarity of its use, federal
infants. Airline Passenger Groups Support Mandatory FAA Child-Restraint Rule, AIR
SA rY WEEK, June 4, 1990, at 4 [hereinafter Airline Passenger Groups].
279 Voluntary Child-Restraint Regulation, supra note 72, at 4.
280 Id.
285 Fife, supra note 5, at 1246; see also McKenzie & Lee, supra note 11, at 3.
282 Voluntary Child-Restraint Regulation, supra note 72, at 4. The FAA urges that
this statistic renders mandatory child restraint system obsolete. Child Restraint
Hearings, supra note 7, at 77 (statement of Lori Michaelson). It is tragic that the
FAA defines an acceptable level of risk as three dead children. Id.
283 14 C.F.R. § 121.331 (1990).
2- Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7, at 21 (statement of Rep. Jim Lightfoot).
285 14 C.F.R. § 121.331a-d.
2 14 C.F.R. § 121.337.
287 14 C.F.R. §§ 121.571, 135.117.
2- Voluntary Child-Restraint Regulations, supra note 72, at 5; Child Restraint Hear-
ings, supra note 7, at 21 (statement of Rep. Jim Lightfoot).
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law requires oxygen on every flight. The proponents of
mandatory child restraint systems aboard aircraft contend
that child restraints should be similarly mandated.
Another analogy can be made between child and adult
restraints. The Airline Passenger Association of North
America President Richard E. Livingston notes that
[t]he FAA suggests that the use of child restraints should
not be required aboard aircraft because of low exposure
due to the safety of aviation; therefore, accident and inci-
dent rates are so low that there is only a small risk of injury
to unrestrained infants. However, this same low accident
rate applies equally to adults and surely the FAA would
never consider removing seatbelts for adults.289
Taking the obsolescence argument literally, if few oc-
currences of an event rendered a safety precaution obso-
lete, many aviation regulations would be void.290 "If this
line of argument was carried to its logical extreme,.., we
wouldn't require oxygen masks, flame retardant seats or
safety lights on airplanes. In fact, we could allow the air-
lines to sell standing-room only tickets."' 291 Child re-
straints aboard aircraft are no more an obsolete issue than
other safety regulations. Accordingly, supporters of
mandatory restraint systems for children insist that child
restraints should be federally mandated aboard aircraft.
Commercial airlines have a responsibility to every one
of their passengers, including infants under the age of
two, to transport them safely.292 The FAA must mandate
safety procedures to insure that the commercial airlines
can fulfill this duty.293 Infant/child safety restraint re-
quirements are vital to protecting as many passengers as
"9 Airline Passenger Groups, supra note 278, at 4.
Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7, at 8 (statement of Sen. Christopher
Bond).
S/Id.
- Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7, at 80 (statement of Jan Brown, flight
attendant, United Air Lines Flight 232).
29' Id.
possible. 4 Perhaps this is best stated by FAA Adminis-
trator James Busey
[Alithough there is only a small statistical risk to unre-
strained infants because their numbers are few and acci-
dents are rare, forces generated by a crash can exceed a
parent's ability to restrain a child safely, and, additionally,
that in encounters with severe air turbulence, high forces
pose a potential danger to unrestrained [air travelling]
infants." 295
The FAA itself admits that infants are best protected only
when properly restrained. 9 6 One infant saved is a victory
to mandatory child restraint proponents. Any contention
of obselesence offers no reason to discard House Resolu-
tion 4025 and with it, mandatory child restraints aboard
aircraft.
C. Increased Auto Fatalities as a Result of Mandatory Child
Restraints Aboard Aircraft
Opponents of mandatory child restraint systems con-
cede that passage of House Resolution 4025 may reduce
aviation fatalities. 97 However, they contend that automo-
bile fatalities will increase in proportion to this reduc-
tion.298 Basically, this contention arises from four studies
Safety Recommendations, supra note 15, at 1-2; see also Airline Passenger Groups,
supra note 278, at 4.
Voluntary Child-Restraint Regulations, supra note 71, at 4.
See FAA brochure, supra note 23; Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7, at 64
(statement of Anthony J. Broderick, Associate Administrator, FAA); supra notes
22-23 and accompanying text.
-7 Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7, at 61 (statement of Anthony J.
Broderick).
Id. at 62. The FAA bases this contention on four studies. These are:
1) McKenzie & Lee, Ending the Free Ride of Children on Airplanes: A
Myopic Method for Saving Infants'Lives, [reprinted in Child Restraint Hear-
ings, supra note 7, at 135];
2) McKenzie & Warner, The Impact of Airline Deregulation on Highway
Safety. reprinted in Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7, at 135;
3) Windle & Dresner, College of Business and Management, Uni-
versity of Maryland, Mandatory Child Safety Seats in Air Transport. Do
They Save Lives? reprinted in Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7, at
188;
4) Apogee Research, Inc., An Impact Analysis of Requiring Child
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which suggest that the increase in fare prices for families
with young children which might result from mandatory
child restraints299 will cause these families to travel by car
rather than by plane.3 00 These studies suggest that twenty
per cent of the families which now travel by air will be
forced to either not travel or to travel in a "statistically
more dangerous way" by driving.30' The research indi-
cates that this alternative is problematic enough to negate
any benefits obtained by requiring child safety seats on
aircraft.3 0 2 "Statistical analyses ... indicate that the pro-
posal [House Resolution 4025] could endanger more chil-
dren than it would save if the increased cost of airline
travel put more families back on the highways. 3 0 3
This argument is based on the assumption that the pas-
sage of House Resolution 4025 will cause family airline
fares to increase. Again, this is a very speculative assump-
tion. °4 In all likelihood, the airlines will devise different
methods of charging families, since increased fares may
otherwise lead to a decrease in business. 30 5  However,
should airline fares increase for families, this does not
mean that highway deaths will increase.
In the McKenzie study, a project performed by the Cato
Institute, the University of Mississippi, and Clemson Uni-
Safety Seats in Air Transportation reprinted in Child Restraint Hearings,
supra note 7, at 210.
Id.
Three of these studies, the McKenzie and Lee study (the McKenzie study), the
Windle and Dresner study (the Dresner study), and the Apogee study focus on the
issue of mandatory child restraint systems. These will be examined more fully
later. See infra notes 303-314 and accompanying text. The McKenzie and Warner
study does not really address infant child restraints. Child Restraint Hearings, supra
note 14, at 83 (statement of Walter S. Coleman Vice President, OATA).
- See supra notes 240-248 and accompanying text.
-o Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7, at 62 (statement of Anthony J. Broder-
ick, Associate Administrator, FAA).
SO, Waters, supra note 15, at 70.
o2 Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7, at 61-64 (statement of AnthonyJ. Brod-
erick, Associate Administrator, FAA); McKenzie & Lee, supra note 11, at 3; see also
Waters, supra note 15, at 70.
3 McKenzie & Lee, supra note 11, at executive summary.
3o4 See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
30 See supra notes 244-248 and accompanying text.
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versity, researchers conducted a statistical and economic
analysis, concluding that if families are not able to buy air-
line tickets for their entire family, they will return to
travelling by automobile.3 06 According to the study, this
return will impose a danger upon family members thirty
times greater than the danger that an unrestrained infant
faces in an airplane. 0 7 More specifically, the increase
could
translate into more than 1,600 additional automobile acci-
dents each year, and the increase in accidents could result
in more than 175 additional disabling injuries and just
under five additional deaths each year. The additional au-
tomobile accidents could also add six million dollars to the
country's total annual economic losses associated with au-
tomobile wrecks on top of the additional air fares that the
FAA estimates families will have to pay.308
This entire hypothesis rests on the assumption that air
and highway travel are interchangeable and, therefore, in-
creases or decreases in fare prices alter the level of traffic
on the nation's highways. 30 9 Another study, performed by
Apogee Research, Inc. for the FAA, suggests that this in-
terchange does indeed occur and that the occurrence can
be expected to increase serious injuries to family travelers
by 4.8 percent in the first year and the number of deaths
-06 McKenzie & Lee, supra note 11, at 2-3.
7o Id. at 4. The researchers admit that their calculations are rough. Id at 5.
Indeed, the study report offers little in the way of procedure and data
presentation.
Id. at 4.
Id. The study contends that an increase in highway travel is dangerous be-
cause "highway accidents, injuries, and deaths are highly correlated with the
amount of highway travel and congestion." Id (citing McKenzie & Warner, The
Impact of Airline Deregulation on Highway Safety, COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INST., Dec.
1987. But see McKenzie & Lee, supra note 11, at 4.
If the number of automobile trips by families goes up by a third of
the estimated reductions in infant boardings and if the average
length of the trips is four hundred miles one way (eight hundred
miles round trip), automobile travel will increase by [only] one hun-
dred eighty five million miles each year. That represents a very
small percentage increase in automobile travel.
Id. Again, there is no proof that air fares will increase because of mandatory child
restraint systems. See supra notes 243-247 and accompanying text.
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among family travelers by 8.2 persons over a ten year pe-
riod.3 0  There are no estimates of how many of these
travelers would be infants or children .3 1  However, the
study contends that at least some infants who might have
been safe on an airplane will die on the highways.31
A third study, the Dresner study, supports the conten-
tions of McKenzie and Apogee.3 13 This study used ex-
isting travel statistics and fatality information in
determining that mandatory child safety seats "will result
in an increase in lives lost among the travelling public". 31 4
The report concluded that air travelers will indeed be di-
verted to auto travel because of an increase in airfares
caused by mandatory child safety seats.3 1 5 The Dresner
study projects fatality numbers comparable to those of the
Apogee study. 1 6 It concludes that there are no benefits
flowing from mandatory child safety seats. 1 7
The supporters of mandatory child restraints aboard
aircraft answer the allegations of these studies with sev-
eral arguments. First, the supporters do not accept the
assumption that mandatory safety seats equal increased
fares for families with small children.1 8 Basically, the
supporters of this legislation contend that fares will not
slo Benefit and Costs of Child Safety Seat Implementation, APOGEE RESEARCH PUB-
USHED FOR THE FAA, May 1990, at iii [hereinafter APOGEE].
311 Id
3,, Id at iv. More specifically the study indicates that mandatory child restraint
systems would result in 9.3 non-infant fatalities over the first ten years of imple-
mentation, an increase of 8.2 deaths. Serious injuries to all family travelers during
this ten year period would increase by over 2,300. Id.
The NTSB discovered some flaws in Apogee's assumptions inherent in the con-
clusions that they draw. Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7, at 58. Further, the
Board noted problems with Apogee's data base and analysis. Id. Essentially, the
Board and others feel that Apogee, like others examining this issue, did not use
solid data in making its assumptions and drawing its conclusions. Id. at 72.
513 Windle & Dresner, Mandatory Child Safety Seats in Air Transport: Do They Save
Lives?J. oF TRANsP. RES. F. (1990), reprinted in Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7,
at 188.
314 Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7, at 89.
315Id. at 129.
-,0 Id. at 200.
- Id. at 208.
318 See supra notes 244-248 and accompanying text.
1991]COMMETS219drive families out of the skies and on to the highways.31 9
Instead, they assert that families "will continue to choose
to fly because airlines, rather than risk the loss of one or
more adult fares or perhaps an entire family unit, will of-
fer a fare arrangement acceptable even for families travel-
ling with infants who previously would have flown
free. '3 2 0 The researchers themselves admit that if the fare
increase does not occur, the correlated highway deaths
will not occur. 2 '
Second, a study done by General Motors Research Lab-
oratories suggests that air travel is not any more safe than
car travel, negating the opposition's argument even if
families were to drive instead of fly.32 2 This study con-
cludes that there are several reasons why automobiles are
just as safe as aircraft for a travelling family. 23 First, in
studies comparing the death rate for air travel with the
death rate for car travel, researchers arrive at the rates in
incongruous ways, making them incomparable. 4 The
airline rate is established as passenger fatalities, per pas-
senger mile, but the road travel rate is calculated using all
fatalities, including those of pedestrians and bystanders,
and is expressed in terms of fatalities per vehicle mile.3 2 5
Second, the automobile travel that competes with airline
"9 See Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7, at 46.
520 Id. at 84 (statement of Walter S. Coleman, Vice President, OATA).
32, APOGEE, supra note 310, at iv.
For example, if fares for infants were set at one half of the average
coach fare, the change in fatalities of all family travellers would de-
cline from the base forecast of 0.9 increase in the first year to a
slightly lower 0.5 increase, or 11.6 net fatalities over the first ten
years. Likewise, net travel costs for families would decline from
$252 million in the first year to $153 million while the net change in
airline revenues, while remaining positive, would drop from $119
million to $80 million.
Id. Presumably, if there were no substantial fare increase, there would be no air to
auto interchange and thus, no increased highway fatalities.
-12 Evans, Frick, & Schwing, Is it Safer to Fly or Drive:-A Problem in Risk Communi-
cation, GENERAL MOTORS RESEARCH LABORATORIES--OPERATION SCIENCES DEPART-
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travel often takes place on the rural interstate system, not
on the average, dangerous, congested road. 26 Finally,
personal habits and traits, like vehicle characteristics,
driver behavior, driver age, alcohol use, safety belt use,
car mass, and roadway type, influence automobile travel-
ers, but do not affect air travellers.3 27 This study con-
cluded that car trips by many drivers involve lower fatality
risks than those of airline flights.32 8 Specifically,
[Forty] year old, belted, alcohol-free drivers of cars 700
pounds heavier than average are slightly less likely to be
killed in 600 miles of rural Interstate driving than in regu-
larly scheduled airline trips of the same length. For 300
mile trips, the driving risk is about half that of flying.32 9
The study reveals that parents of young children, the
people allegedly being forced onto the highways, are con-
sidered more at risk by flying than driving.330 This in-
creased risk occurs because parents of young children
come closest to the GM study's profile of the most careful
driver. Also, these people are generally more responsible
and conscientious than those of other ages and
lifestations.33 '
Third, proponents of mandatory child restraints aboard
aircraft question the validity of the studies relied upon by
the FAA.3 3 2 Experts point to problems in the studies' data
and analysis.33 Primarily, the proponents worry that the
"FAA is vigorously defending highway safety based upon
a bunch of assumptions on assumptions which no one re-
326 Id.
327 Evans, supra note 322, at 14-15.
-28 Id. at 15.
329 Id.
3-0 l at 14-15. The proponents of mandatory child restraint systems on air-
craft contend that the studies that the FAA relied upon failed to consider that
parents travelling with young children have considerably lower accident risks than
do other groups of drivers. Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7, at 86 (statement
of Christopher J. Witowski, Sececutive Director, Aviation Consumer and Action
Project). This oversight may render the FAA studies defective. Id. at 88.
3 Cohen interview, supra note 30.
332 Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7, at 88 (statement of Christopher J.
Witowski.
333 See supra note 312 and accompanying text.
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ally can validate. 3 3 4 Finally, many transportation experts
have a difficult time accepting the mixing of highway and
aviation statistics.3 3 5 Susan Coughlin, vice chairman of
the NTSB, contends,
I think we are confusing the issues when we start compar-
ing aviation safety to highway safety. The FAA, the ones
to whom we addressed this recommendation, are respon-
sible for aviation safety. There is no one who is making
the argument that we are not safer buckled in and re-
strained in those seats during the critical phases of
flight. 336
Ms. Coughlin suggests that the air to automobile in-
terchange on which the FAA grounds its argument is not
an appropriate diversion to assume. 3 7
Basically, the proponents of mandatory child restraint
systems stress that parents will not abandon air flight for
travel by car because of House Resolution 4025. How-
ever, should parents choose to drive rather than fly, the
General Motors Study indicates that they will not increase
the risks of death or injury to themselves or their children
by simply being on the highway.
VI. CONCLUSION
In today's transient society, thousands of children em-
bark daily upon the most popular form of long distance
travel, flying. The danger inherent in infants and small
children travelling by air without proper safety restraint
mechanisms remains uncontroverted. Scientific research
and dramatic, real life tragedies demonstrate the danger
children face when they fly unrestrained. The fact that
children are allowed to travel by aircraft without standard
safety devices contradicts basic safety principles.
Strong arguments support legislation mandating child
restraint systems on all aircraft. Professional safety ex-
:- Child Restraint Hearings, supra note 7, at 73 (statement of Rep. Jim Lightfoot).
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perts insist that mandatory child restraint systems are the
only way to protect children from serious injury or death
while travelling by air. In addition, the experience of the
automotive industry demonstrates the need for child re-
straint systems on board aircraft. It seems obvious that if
children need restraints while travelling on the ground at
sixty miles per hour, they need restraints while travelling
thirty thousand feet in the air at six hundred miles per
hour. Finally, constitutional equal protection demands
that young children travel in the same safe manner in
which adults travel-restrained. Children deserve to en-
joy the same level of safety that the rest of the air travel-
ling population experiences. Child restraint systems are
apparently an unavoidable necessity aboard all aircraft.
However, the FAA has some cogent arguments oppos-
ing such mandatory child restraint systems. The FAA
contends that mandatory child restraint systems will result
in insurmountable costs both to families and the air car-
rier industry. According to FAA studies, these higher
costs will cause families to seek a less expensive, but less
safe means of travel-the highways. After examining the
FAA's arguments, it is apparent that they can be coun-
tered. It is not clear that mandatory child restraint sys-
tems will increase anyone's expenses or result in a loss of
profits to any industry. Evidence suggests that families
will not be forced to give up flying and turn to driving.
Moreover, even if families were to do so, the General Mo-
tors study indicates that the projected increase in fatalities
among such families would not come to pass, because
highway driving for families with young children is no
more dangerous than flying.
The FAA also suggests that the child restraint legisla-
tion is unnecessary and will result in extraordinary costs
to the airlines. This suggestion is contradictory. If the
legislation is not needed because few children fly, families
will not need to buy tickets; airlines will not lose revenue
which they never had.
The need for child restraint systems on all aircraft has
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not been rendered obsolete. Without mandatory child re-
straint legislation, it appears that children will continue to
suffer needless injuries and deaths in air incidents from
which they might have emerged unscathed. Saving the
life of just one infant makes the proposed legislation
worthwhile. Those favoring this legislation indicate that
mandatory child safety restraints can be implemented
with little monetary cost. However, even if some mone-
tary sacrifices are involved, the real issue is not cost but
the lives of innocent, helpless children. Children deserve
to be protected from life threatening forces that they can
not control. Accordingly, child restraints must be
mandatory on all aircraft.

